


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ONTARIO COMMISSION ON THE LEGISLATURE

*Ont. [Commissions and Committees of
Inquiry]*



FIRST REPORT · MAY 1973



Commissioners
DALTON CAMP
Chairman
DOUGLAS M. FISHER
FARQUHAR R. OLIVER
Executive Secretary
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Ontario
Commission
on the
Legislature

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
Ferguson Block
Queen's Park
Toronto Ontario


To the Honourable Allan E. Reuter
Speaker of the Legislative Assembly


Dear Mr. Speaker:

We, the undersigned, Dalton Kingsley Camp, Douglas Mason Fisher and Farquhar Robert Oliver, appointed Commissioners by Order-in-Council 1960/72 and approved by His Honour the Lieutenant Governor of Ontario on the 14th day of June, 1972, to study the function of the Legislative Assembly with a view to making such recommendations as the Commission deems advisable with respect thereto, with particular reference to the role of the Private Members and how their participation in the process of Government may be enlarged, including the services, facilities and benefits provided to the Members of the Assembly,


beg to submit to you, Mr. Speaker, this First Report of the Commission.


Chairman


Commissioner


Commissioner

May, 1973



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ONTARIO COMMISSION ON THE LEGISLATURE

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PREFACE

This Report deals with the pay and allowances provided Members of the Ontario Legislature. It is the first of three or more reports which we shall make to fulfil our terms of reference.

There is a link between all three subject areas which the Commission has been asked to study and to make recommendations upon:

- i. pay and expenses of M.P.P.s;
- ii. electoral and party funding and financial disclosure; and
- iii. reforms or alterations in the system and practices and services of the Legislature.

It is necessary that we make and issue our reports in this order. It happens also to be hazardous to such an extent that we make a plea to readers and interpreters of this first report. Analyze and criticize this first report and the second when it comes later this year; but remember that the remunerations and services and the political financing provisions that we recommend are in the context of a revitalized Legislature and a somewhat altered emphasis in purposes for legislators. That is, our first two reports lead in the final one which will be the ultimate justification, if we may be so immodest, of the earlier recommendations.

The three Commissioners have all been active in party politics. We do not disclaim this interest and experience for the precious values of non-partisanship or neutrality. Rather, we underline it. We believe strongly in the continuing need for party politics. Therefore, we do not try to elaborate or preserve distinctions between the role of the

legislator as a constituency man or as tribune of the people or an individual lawmaker.

We regret that so many people use phrases such as "playing politics" or "mere partisanship" with sneering or cynical implications. We have noted the penchant of the press to scorn the "curse" of party discipline or to be most impatient with the functioning of the party "machines" in both the electoral and the legislative processes.

The legislators for whom we make recommendations are primarily partisan advocates who must be seen as working essentially within a system that requires partisan activity - in elections, between elections, in the Legislature, in the caucus, in the party organization both provincially and nationally.

An emphasis on our part that there is not a higher political nobility for the neutral or the non-partisan person does not mean we believe all is for the best in the present, functioning state of the parties.

THE MEMBER AND THE LEGISLATURE

The "first cause" or "sky-hook" that we want for this first report on the Ontario Legislature is a perception of both the present role of its Members and what the role might be or ought to be, within the rather indistinct limits of the parliamentary system.

The blurred limits or vague boundaries of the system must be emphasized. For example, much of the dynamic for the parliamentary system of government comes from two of its parts which are rarely seen or understood in a clear-cut fashion. There is not a broad comprehension of their powers and workings. These parts are the political parties and the public service or bureaucracy.

What is called "ministerial responsibility" drapes the latter and protects it, sometimes over-protecting it, making mystery and secrecy of its operations, even in its most ordinary administrative processes.

When bureaucracy was small and government programs few and easily understood, ministerial responsibility made more sense than it often does today when so much of government and administration is delegated to a growing gaggle of bodies with responsibilities and duties (e.g. crown corporations, review boards, advisory councils, etc.) which are at one or two removes from the Minister or the Legislature. High in our perception of the Legislature as it ought to be is a much closer scrutiny and understanding of the provincial bureaucracy, from "line" departments to the ONR and the WCB, than pertains at present.

The function of party is vital to the whole system, particularly to the legislative part of it, yet the parties and party leadership in the Legislature have no absolute control of their Members. In the work of the Legislature there is always (and must always be) an opportunity for

a Member, if he or she wishes, to jump the party position and to speak or vote as he or she sees fit. If this became the norm, rather than the unusual, there would probably be chaos until other adjustments in the system took place. Our point is, however, that we know our recommendations must not provide the political party as it manifests itself in the Legislature, whether in Government or in Opposition, with the absolute recognition and the resources which would wipe out the potential of individual expression and action by any Member of the Legislature.

It would not become us and it would be fatuous to make too much of the situation in Ontario since the last war, which has given us three fairly strong political parties with structures, membership, organizational activities and financing across the broad face of the Province. As yet this tri-partite activity, in its appeal to voters, has not had the consequence of minority government in Ontario. Minority government has been a possibility. It might happen. We make mention of it because any consideration of it immediately reminds us that the primacy of focus in the parliamentary system is on the Legislature, notably on the Government or Ministry in the Legislature.

Ours is not simply a system which gives all to the Government between elections, even though the usual situation in Ontario which has a Government backed by an absolute majority of Members, tends to sustain the opinion that governing takes absolute priority in the Ontario Legislature. The merits of the recent and current party situation in Ontario are that continuing organizations with activists and ideas are always at work, interacting with communities and pressure groups and individuals, and reaching into the Legislature for expression and advocacy.

There is a recognizable current in public opinion which believes that once a government's leadership is determined at a general election, then that leadership "runs" the province with a minimum of interference until the next election. When this opinion is pushed too far, it leaves an inconsequential role in the Legislature for the ordinary Member supporting the Government and only a peripheral, critical role for Members

of parties in opposition.

"After all," say those of this opinion, "the Government must get on with running the Province."

If this viewpoint has wide support and becomes pervasive there tends to be a diminution in the role of the Legislature. Debates rife with criticism of the Government and votes on appropriations and bills become empty formalities to fill time. The right of Members, individually or in concert by party, to move amendments or to take initiatives (within the traditional limitation that only a Minister of the Crown may introduce a spending motion) becomes a hollow ritual.

It seems obvious from the experience of the Ontario Legislature in modern times that governments have not had major problems from obstructionism by Members from the Opposition parties, nor from what Sir John A. Macdonald called "loose fish" on the Government benches. This suggests to us that some flexibility, some roominess, is in the system. Shifts in the methods and practices of the Legislature are possible in order to give more opportunity and responsibility to Members of both the Government and the Opposition parties in the Assembly and in its committee microcosms without confounding firm, prompt government.

A SKETCH OF THE JOB AND ROLE OF THE ONTARIO M.P.P.

It is trite but true to state that the people in Ontario, in their constituencies, by constituency, choose their representatives to the Legislature at general elections. Thus the "representative" function in constituency terms is clear. The choice is made from the candidates within the constituency. There is not a direct choice by the people of the Premier of the Province.

The citizens, of course, choose from more than the individual qualities of the constituency candidates. The candidates represent parties in

most cases and the parties have leaders. The parties normally have "programs" or "platforms" to offer for the election campaign.

On election night the leader of the party with the most victorious candidates takes the right, or is reconfirmed in the right, to head the Ontario Government as Premier.

This right includes the power to choose his Ministry or Executive, to meet the new Legislature at his call, to present his legislative program within the prerogatives of the agenda and rules which have been established by the Legislature, and generally, through the support of majority votes in the Legislature to get approval for the executive's program of legislation and appropriations, not once but again and again, item by item, during the life of the Legislature. Further, the Premier has the right to assign departmental and other executive and administrative responsibilities to his Ministers. He can shift or dismiss his Ministers as he sees fit or is practicable. He has the right of appointment to deputy-ministerships and to various posts at the head of provincial agencies.

Those victors on election night who are not members of the winning party are entitled to membership in the Legislature and to vote there as they see fit on measures introduced by the Government. They can introduce measures of their design and choosing, provided these do not require direct, spending appropriations. They scrutinize the performance of the Government. They question the Ministry. They function singly or as party groups in opposition to the Government until it is overthrown in the Legislature (which rarely happens) or until the next general election.

We note from our sketch that ALL Members of the Legislature represent their constituencies. Beyond such constituency obligation some Members have the responsibility to form and operate the Government (i.e. the Premier and his Ministers); some other Members accept the responsibility to support the Government (i.e. the Government Backbencher); some other Members have the right to oppose the Government.

What makes sense out of all this, what keeps us from a flux of individualism and a mere profusion of constituency representation and advocacy is "party".

It is normal that a Member represents one of the political parties. Either he sustains the Premier and his Government in the Assembly, or he opposes him and his Government, in league with his party colleagues in the Assembly.

In theory, sometimes in practice, an individual M.P.P. develops his own policy ideas and presents them and advocates them outside of his party context. More likely, in theory and in practice, his input in policy and legislative ideas is concerted with his party colleagues. Thus the M.P.P. may be a maker and advocate of policy but this is usually done within the party context.

An Opposition Member is seen to have a function in preparing and carrying on a running critique of the Ministry and the Government operation as a whole. He may press his critique in many places and occasions but especially he does so in the Legislature. There he sets his party's policies against the Government's. There he may scrutinize spending and vote for or against Government proposals and appropriations after criticizing them and amending them where possible.

An example of the kind of criticism which we as commissioners may expect, and our hypothetical reply to it, may explain why we have made this long paraphrase of a Grade 10 civics course description of the Member and the Legislature.

The criticism may go like this. The Commissioners recommend such perquisites for M.P.P.s as subsidized air travel and subsidized automobile travel within constituencies. Most of the recipients of these perquisites will abuse them. They will use them to flit to party functions. They will carry on partisan political activity at the taxpayers' expense.

Our answer is that each M.P.P. is a party man or woman. It is impossible to draw a line between the role as constituency representative and regional spokesman and legislator and committee-man AND the Member as partisan. Our concern is that the Member be as well equipped and supported as possible to be the complete representative. This means the Member for Parry Sound who drives to the far end of his riding - say to Mattawa - is likely, indeed almost certain, to combine work on specific constituency matters with discussions with fellow partisans. The controls on extravagance and waste are twofold. The first is simply that at the next election the Member's own electorate can strike him from the roll of the Legislature if they feel he has overdone partisanship in carrying on his work. The second is something we hope will be built into the "perquisite" program - complete and open disclosure of the spending.

The following list of the various duties a Member undertakes makes clear the omnibus role of the Provincial Member.

The Member is spokesman in the riding and in the region and in the Legislature and in its committees and in the party caucus and in the party organization at at least three levels.

He is the spokesman for individuals and groups, for himself and for his party. If "spokesman" in some cases seems too strong a term, he is certainly a listener and a reporter or conduit in all these situations.

The Member is expected to take part as listener, questioner, debater, and voter, in the Legislature and in those of its committees to which he is assigned.

The Member is expected to hear or read the problems of his constituents, and usually, those of any others who make representations to him on personal matters which relate to government. Often these representations are across the band of all three levels of government in Ontario because

the citizen often doesn't distinguish, or isn't able to distinguish, between each jurisdiction's responsibility. This means the Member must be an ombudsman of a kind, an intervenor with the bureaucracy, an explainer of legislation, regulation, structure and process.

Above all, a Member is vulnerable in the sense that he ignores inquisitors or supplicants for help at peril to his re-election. Given the penetrating reach of the telephone and the automobile, he may be forced to schedule much of his response to requests and demands in hours of the day and the week that most people consider to be their own and private.

What we have sketched about the Member's role has not stressed the demands on him within the Legislature itself. It is there that much of the skimping and shortfall in performance is taking place. Put most brutally, government and its administration steadily increases in complexity, size, and resource. Reports, studies, and expertise proliferate. Few legislative proposals are simple and clear-cut. The Ministries are sustained by an increasingly impressive array of talent and organizational ability to which the ordinary Member of Government or Opposition has limited access and few ready rights of use. Surely the time has come to recognize that the disbalance, not so much towards the Government but towards its highly knowledgeable bureaucracies, must be countered by stepping up the resources, facilities and services of the Legislature and the legislator.

In concluding this sketch of the Member's role we should say more about the "Opposition" function.

With the separation of the executive and legislative functions the Americans deprive themselves of the on-going, between-elections role of the losing party leaders.

The American terms for party in the Legislature are the "Majority" and the "Minority". Ours are the "Government" and the "Opposition".

At first custom, and eventually legislation and parliamentary rules, created the role of the "Leader of the Official Opposition" within the parliamentary system.

The Member brings into the Legislature with him the constituency label and his party affiliation, both of which are recognized and described in the way he is addressed and the location of his seat in the House.

While custom recognizes that a Member of the party which has formed the Government has the right both to criticize and oppose the Government's measures, we repeat that this is unusual - not unique but unusual. At the heart of the system is the general rule that Government Members support the Government and Opposition Members oppose it. In the latter's case it is important to note that Members of the Opposition, whether those led by the Leader of the "Official Opposition" or those in unofficial opposition, have an obligation to criticize and oppose the Government and its works within the Legislature. However, this is never an absolute - no more so than that the Government Member should always support the Government. Some measures may meet the approval of the "Official Opposition" and/or the unofficial opposition.

The tradition of the parliamentary system is that it is a "two-party" system. This has been particularly the British system and attitude, even though the British electorate has been choosing Members from more than two parties for over seventy years. Essentially, the third and other parties have not been so numerous in the British Parliament as they have tended to be in some Canadian legislatures. The Ontario reality since the early 1920s is that we have tended to have three parties represented in the Legislature and the oft-heralded return to the "two-party" system is not in sight. One consequence of the reality is that both the Leader of the Third Party and the entitlement of the Third Party to recognition and resources as a caucus have been established. This may have developed at the expense of the Official Opposition. The fact is that our recommendations

are made with an awareness that there are three parties in the Legislature, but give priority in recognition, responsibilities and resources to the Leader of the Official Opposition and his supporters in the Assembly.

An assumption which is intrinsic in the parliamentary system, indeed what we platitudinously call "democracy", is that the struggle to capture or to hold public opinion never stops. Some call it continuous party warfare, others sniff at it as partisan gamesmanship. The Government in the Legislature always seeks to exploit its achievements and to defend its policies and administration. The Opposition attacks, probes, scorns, and puts alternatives. There's nothing new in this.

The constant legislative struggle means that neither side of the Government-Opposition makeup of the Legislature is ever wholly satisfied with the rules and practices. The Opposition frets at limitations on its work. The Government deplores the Opposition's intransigence, its penchant for niggling and wasting time. Each is jealous of its prerogatives and responsibilities. We are interjecting our recommendations into this always contentious situation with a sharp appreciation that we cannot please all. To reiterate, we have no intention of pleasing those who downgrade partisanship. Our prime aim is to enhance the Legislature through more effective M.P.P.s.

FULL-TIME OR PART-TIME

Is being a Member of the Provincial Parliament of Ontario a full-time job?

Overwhelmingly, most present Members think it is or that it should be so considered. Even those who disagree acknowledge that the work-load has such an unavoidable weight now that it is almost impossible to treat it as a part-time responsibility. Many Members keep their hands in either professional practices or small businesses - some as an insurance come

defeat, some as an income supplement, some simply because it keeps them in touch with their interests, many for a blend of these reasons.

While the sessions have slowly and steadily lengthened in the past decade and there is much more committee work going on in the microcosms of the Assembly, there is almost total agreement that the major increment has been in the so-called "case-load" - that is, inquiries made by constituents and to be dealt with by the M.P.P. These requests may be merely for information; they may be for assistance in handling personal or family or group problems. Of course, no distinctions are made by most supplicants for assistance between the jurisdictions of governments.

In terms of scale of demand from constituents, it is impossible to draw a distinction any longer between rural and urban ridings. The larger farm and hinterland ridings clearly put strong pressure on an M.P.P.'s time; so much so that many Members who represent them are reconciled to a stern reality. They do not have a solid chance to be outstanding or regular contributors to the debates of the Legislature. A few big city ridings seem a soft touch in comparison. Usually these easier ridings are those with large middle-to-high income enclaves. A riding next door with a large share of its citizens in low income ranges may just inundate an M.P.P. with "case-load" work.

Surveys by academics and empirical examination by politicians have shown that the more affluent and the better-educated (there is an overlap, if not an identity, between the two) have the understanding and the means to handle most of their individual and group problems with government without turning to their M.P.P. or M.P.

Frankly, one cannot be sure what are the expectations of most citizens on the "full-time" matter. Most of those who are relatively unfamiliar with Ontario government and politics seem to assume that an M.P.P. has a full-time job. It is also evident that active party members have come more and more to the opinion that their candidate when elected must be on

the job full-time. Indeed, with the three parties in contention in so many of the ridings in each election, it has become increasingly dangerous to re-election prospects for an M.P.P. to be charged with absenteeism or a part-time casualness about his work as a Member.

Perhaps the major postulate that emerged from interviews with M.P.P.s was this: constituency demands are such that substantial resources and services must be provided Members if they are to hold, let alone increase, their capacity to take part in the work of the Legislature. And most Members do, as we do, give primacy to this latter function of the M.P.P. If he is not a legislator, concerned with bills and estimates and spending, then the disbalancing trend towards the executive within the parliamentary institutions becomes permanent.

There lingers in Canada and Ontario a slightly unsavory aura around the phrase a "full-time politician" or a "professional politician". It is easy and understandable, particularly for those aware of British practice and tradition, to extol the virtues of the amateur in politics. You know the themes: the Legislature as a cross-section of occupations and achievements in education and community endeavour; the M.P.P. as not beholden to party or to the income from the job. We think that day has gone in Ontario, at least in terms of "easy-in", occasional activity; then "easy-out" of politics.

The amateur ideal gives an inordinate advantage to candidates who are lawyers or small entrepreneurs or farmers. It is less suitable for those who are employees of large organizations, private and public. So many skills in a specialized work-force cannot readily be taken up or dropped during the gaps in the parliamentary year, or turned to on a basis of two or three days a week.

Another factor injected into this subject by the M.P.P.s seems at first to be peripheral. Every Opposition Member had complaints about the indefiniteness of the legislative year in general and bitterness

over the haphazard timing of bills and estimates and committee work during sessions. A surprisingly large minority of supporters of the Government agreed that the management of business in the Legislature was unpredictable, with bad forecasts or no forecasts at all. A more measured, planned session, even a planned year of business, was a consistent wish of the Opposition Members.

The unpredictable sequences in the Legislature tie in with the increasing use of standing and select committees to bedevil any thoughtful apportionment by an M.P.P. of his time and energies, particularly in light of the burgeoning case load. It seems clear from views expressed by those on the executive side that sessions are going to lengthen rather than shorten - that there will be more, not less, committee work. Most of the Government Members who are not ministers or parliamentary assistants expressed their desire to have more in-put, at least through caucus, if not in the Assembly or its committees, for their views on policy and bills.

All the factors and trends covered in the two preceding paragraphs give us a picture of serious, responsible Members who want to make their work more rational and more effective, more professional if you want. All this underlines the reasons why we feel it is time to accept that being a Provincial Member in Ontario is a full-time job. Time and again we heard from M.P.P.s that their duties were more onerous than those of Federal Members of Parliament. An exact calculus of comparison is not available to us but in our judgment they are right, certainly they are right in believing they have a heavier constituency load than most Federal M.P.s from Ontario.

We got contradictory indications on whether the present system of pay and allowances and services for Members is to sustain someone whose single occupation and chief source of income is to be a Member.

The proliferation of appointments of Government Members to boards and commissions, with their various emoluments, is frankly taken to be a means of augmenting income and rewarding diligent Government supporters. Such supplements and the award of these apparently extra tasks is grist for those who think being a Member is a part-time thing. So does the practice of giving a substantial (\$50) daily allowance plus expenses to Members who take part in the work of select committees. After all, if one were a full-time politician there would be no justification for such bonusing. Similarly, the haphazard provisions of secretarial and research assistance to Members (through caucus allotments) leave many Members with half-time secretaries, some with full-time secretaries. The wide discrepancies in the use and availability of research almost argue that specialization in subjects and in-depth study is a random matter rather than an understood responsibility of each Member.

On the other hand, most of the general public, especially those in the work-force who make less than the \$18,000 a year (\$12,000 salary, \$6,000 tax-free allowance), certainly consider such an income sets up a full occupation or close to it. It is the opinion of veteran M.P.P.s, in the main, that the sessions and work demands have grown so much that being a Member is a complete occupation, even though some of them regret that this should be so.

A substantial number of Members made the point to us that a defeat after four years would make their personal re-adjustment rough in terms of occupation and income for many of them and, after eight years or more in the Legislature, it would be very difficult to take up a career again at anywhere near the income level of those in similar circumstances who had not gone into politics. That is, the penalties in income and career terms for an interval in the Assembly are such that service in the latter should be remunerated accordingly, both in salary, expenses and pensions.

Elsewhere in our Report is evidence that two complementary trends

have been altering the composition of the Ontario Legislature. The average age of Members is dropping; the level of educational and technical qualifications of Members is rising. Neither trend is regrettable. Of course, the consequence is fewer Members than of yore have, as is said colloquially, "made it". There are more and more Members with the obligations of young families and without the personal resources of those with consummated careers.

What does the M.P.P. do with his time? It is our first insight that circumstance and a rapidly encroaching tradition are forcing him to spend too much of his personal time on problems of his constituents. This would be disturbing, simply as an indication that the administration by Ontario Government, particularly in dealings with individual citizens, is difficult or awkward or uneven. Whatever the efficacy of representative intervention or advocacy, it seems to us that major steps are necessary in order to free the Member for more time and attention to be given to legislative duties. Too often debates are ill-attended and often given a perfunctory hearing because the burden of constituency affairs diverts or distracts the Member. Committees wait for quorums while chairmen scramble for bodies. Less obvious but still important is the need for Members to give more attention to caucus responsibilities. A deep personal involvement in constituents' problems does give an M.P.P. a monitor's feel for malfunctioning departments and agencies, or for inadequate legislation and regulations. However, such faultiness can be appreciated almost as well at some remove through those delegated by the M.P.P. to carry on the constituency work, especially the routine work, while the Member puts more of his time in the study and discussion basically required before he can make contributions of excellence to the Assembly, its committees, and to his caucus.

Nothing seems more deleterious to public respect or to the self-respect of the Member than long hours of so-called debate or hearings to which only a small minority listen and which have little or no influence on Ministers or officials. The constituency obsession is at

the heart of the malaise which so many divine in the parliamentary system. We would leave the Member, through our recommendations, with as little excuse as possible for diversion of his time and talents away from the exacting work of making law and examining administration and spending.

Perhaps one can overdo with points about the high risks and the extreme vulnerability of the elected career in Ontario. Perhaps those who extoll the need for sacrifice in representing the public in government have a worthy ideal in mind. Those who have no qualms about the tendency we see for major elected office to become more and more the preserve of the well-to-do will dismiss our concern that M.P.s have better income and pension provisions.

In our canvass of this matter in other jurisdictions and countries we found nothing more blunt on this subject than "the four fundamental propositions" in the Report (1970) of the New Zealand Royal Commission Upon Parliamentary Salaries and Allowances:

- (a) That the occupation of a member of Parliament should be regarded as virtually full-time and professional in nature;
- (b) That it should be assumed that a member of Parliament has no other income;
- (c) That it should be accepted that members are married with family commitments;
- (d) That regard should be had to the sacrifices a member and his wife (or husband) have to make in respect of their enjoyment of leisure and family life.

THE LEGISLATURE AS AN INSTITUTION, WITH ITS OFFICERS

A significant step in strengthening the role of the Legislature is to give some substance to the assertion that what happens there is important, that the Legislature is not simply a tail wagged by the Governmental dog. It seems to us that the time has come to reaffirm the principle of the independence of the Legislature, and to see that this principle is given reflection in practice. It would, of course, be patently untrue to state that under a parliamentary system such as ours the Legislature is separate from the Executive: this is not our intention. The Executive will continue to exert a considerable influence in the Legislature by means of its majority party status: we feel it is desirable that this be so. However, we feel it is undesirable that the Legislature should seem to be dependent on the Executive for its very existence. A key element in effecting this goal is to establish the independence of the Legislature's first officer, the Speaker, and of his lieutenant and the chief permanent officer of the Legislature, the Clerk.

At present the Speaker and the Clerk do not have the separation from the Government which would be manifested by their own right to strike estimates, handle a budget, hire and let go employees, and generally head and administer a distinctive legislative branch. The responsibility for these tasks presently resides in the Ministry, with the result that it is the Government which determines how and to what extent legislative requirements will be filled.

It is unusual that a Legislature which is in so many respects modelled after the British "Mother of Parliaments", should be so much at odds with it in terms of the position accorded its key officials, the Speaker and the Clerk. There the authority and impartiality of the Speaker are central to his role as representative of the House of Commons. His high status (as second commoner in the land, preceded only by the Lord President of Council) is a reflection of the prestige of the House. Such a

position would not be possible if the House, through the Speaker, were figuratively cap-in-hand for any requirement to the Ministry. However, in the British Parliament the Speaker has ultimate responsibility for the preparation of all estimates in connection with the operation of the House of Commons, and for the accounting of all expenditure in this connection. He has final control of the accommodation and services in all precincts occupied by or on behalf of the House of Commons. He is assisted in these capacities by the Clerk, as Accounting Officer of the House, and by a committee of Members known as the House of Commons (Services) Committee.

A similar situation exists with respect to the positions of the Speaker and the Clerk in the Canadian Parliament. Although the manner of organization is slightly different, the Speaker has ultimate charge of all the estimates and expenditures associated with the operation of the House.

The Commission is intent on a similar independence for the Speaker and the Clerk in Ontario, and on emphasizing the primacy of their function as officials and servants of the Assembly, without any intimation of the slightest kind that they are controlled or even influenced by the Ministry. Their duty is to the Assembly and to each of its Members as seen within the good of the whole. Of course, this requires adroitness and a marked capacity to rise above contention. Respect for the Offices, and a deep belief in the good will and high purpose of the Speaker and the Clerk, are slow to develop when these officers are dependent on the Ministry for the fulfilment of their smallest personnel or financial needs.

We are confident that the good sense of the assembled Members is always a counter to any delusions of grandeur or arbitrary behaviour on the part of a Speaker and Clerk who are accorded the independence we recommend. We envisage a committee of Members who would assist the Speaker in his administrative and procedural capacities. Such a committee would

ideally come to foster a legislative expertise which the Speaker could draw on in determining the need for changes in the rules and procedure of the House, or attempting to meet the need for services and facilities among the Members.

A number of benefits grow out of the independence of the Assembly's officials. They see more readily and can arrange the changes necessary to make the forum more attractive and understandable to the public. They can scrutinize and admonish the behaviour and practices of Members in the Assembly and its committees. In their staff, a loyalty to the legislative branch of government can be fostered. An institutional dignity may ensue, which ameliorates any excesses in Government high-handedness or Opposition obduracy.

COMPENSATION

INDEMNITIES AND ALLOWANCES

The Commission has examined the questions as to Members' pay, allowances, services and perquisites with two basic principles in mind, those of equity and accountability.

Everyone will surely agree that our legislators are entitled to a reasonable rate of compensation, and that expenses incurred by them in the course of carrying out their duties should be met as they are in other political jurisdictions and, indeed, in the realm of standard practice. But, in this regard the public should know what these payments are, to whom they are paid, and for what purposes. In short, there should be as exacting a standard of accountability as possible, such as the Legislature itself demands of the Government and such as the general public would expect of both.

With respect to the total income of Members, including their expenses, various allowances and other tax-free benefits, there has not been (or at least there is not now) either a satisfactory degree of accountability nor is there an appropriate degree of equity. This is to the discredit of no one; both Private Members and Ministers have complained of it. Overall, there are practices which have simply taken root, proliferated, and now fundamentally serve to shroud the facts about the incomes and benefits received by legislators. Perhaps the system has concealed from the Members themselves the growing gap between their incomes, as perceived by the public, and their real incomes.

Therefore, the first principle the Commission sought to achieve was that of equity - that all Private Members would be paid the same basic salary or indemnity, and all would be compensated with regard to expenses on the same basis.

The Commission, as has been noted at the outset of this Report, is convinced that being a Member of the Ontario Legislative Assembly is a full-time occupation. Not only does this seem to be a fact for the vast majority of Members, but is also the way in which the public perceives the role of their M.P.P.s.

The question then arises as to what the full-time legislator ought to be paid, and what expenses should be allowed him.

In its earlier stages the Commission gave serious thought to abolishing the tax-free allowance of \$6,000. It noted that some of the more experienced Members of the Legislature held the view that the tax-free allowances caused public resentment and invited editorial scolding. The Commission also recognized that the allowances had become, for all intents and purposes, increased indemnities by other means and another name. Why, then, perpetuate them?

From 1969 the Private Member has been receiving an annual indemnity of \$12,000 and a tax-free allowance of \$6,000. In 1972 this gave the Member a net income, after taxes, of \$16,020 (assuming he was married, had two children, and was paying 6% of his annual indemnity towards his pension). If the Member had been obliged to pay tax on both the indemnity and the allowance his net income would, of course, have been less - \$14,020.

Since the Commission concluded that the basic incomes of Members ought to be improved, it was impressed by the implications of doing so without the convenience of the tax-free allowance.

To illustrate this point, consider the following alternatives by which the Member's income, after taxes, is to be set at about \$18,000 - first, by the present practice of "splitting" the income between the taxable indemnity and the tax-free allowance and, second, by eliminating the tax-free allowance and simply increasing the indemnity:

(Taxes are calculated for 1972, assuming the Member is married, has two children, and is paying 7% of his indemnity - the proposed new level of contribution - towards his pension.)

(1)	Indemnity	\$ 16,000	(2)	Indemnity	\$ 26,000
	Less tax	<u>3,180</u>		Less tax	<u>7,150</u>
		\$ 12,820		TOTAL	<u>\$ 18,850</u>
	Plus allowance	<u>6,000</u>			
	TOTAL	<u>\$ 18,820</u>			

The Commission is reluctantly persuaded by arithmetic, as well as by common sense, to retain the tax-free allowance. While it does not like the tax-free allowance, nor do some Members, nevertheless Federal tax law specifically allows it; and the Federal Parliament and Provincial Legislatures, without exception, avail themselves of the advantages of such a law. To do otherwise would require that we raise the Member's salary substantially, more to the advantage of the Receiver General than to the Member. Such would make the M.P.P. unlike other taxpayers, in that he would be deliberately paying more tax, in fact, than the present tax law requires him to pay.

In Table 1 we publish a list showing the combined incomes of Members during 1972-73, including their common indemnities of \$12,000 and tax-free allowance of \$6,000 and adding to this their tax-free mileage allowances, stationery allowance, select committee per diems and expenses, and for Members who sit on Government boards and commissions, their salaries, per diems, and expenses. Table 1 is presented only to indicate the wide range of incomes existing presently among Private Members which the Commission hopes, as a result of its recommendations, will henceforth achieve greater equity and less disparity.

Because of the overall approach of the Commission to its task, and assuming its proposals are accepted, it will not be easy for anyone to say with precision just how much more a Member will receive in total remuneration than he did prior to the Commission's new proposals. Some

TABLE I

M.P.P.s' TOTAL REMUNERATION (Fiscal Year 1972-1973)

The total remuneration figure comprises the basic indemnity and expense allowance (\$18,000) plus moneys received by M.P.P.s under categories such as: mileage allowance, stationery allowance, positions in the Legislature (i.e. whip, chairman of a standing committee, etc.), select committee fees and expense allowances, special appointments (i.e. parliamentary assistant, member of board or commission, etc.)

<u>Total Remuneration</u>	<u>Number of M.P.P.s</u>
\$18,000 - \$20,000	14
\$20,000 - \$22,000	23
\$22,000 - \$24,000	15
\$24,000 - \$26,000	21
\$26,000 - \$28,000	11
above \$28,000	<u>4</u>
	88

(this total does not include Cabinet Ministers or Leaders of the Official Opposition and Third Party)

N.B. In the case of per diem fees for work on select committees, commissions, etc., the amounts were projected from the fees paid as of December 31, 1972.

Members will in fact receive less; others will be entitled to compensation for the first time for various expenses, if vouchered; all will be entitled to a freer use of transportation services within the Province.

The Commission has proposed that Members of the Legislative Assembly of Ontario be placed on the same basis, with respect to travel and accommodation, as their counterparts in the community at large when they travel away from their homes for business reasons.

Argument will be made that there is a significant distinction in that the "counterparts" do not enjoy a tax-free expense allowance for which they need give no accounting. But the response to that is - they would certainly draw such an allowance if the Federal Income Tax Act allowed them to do so. No employer in the land would deny it to them nor, if self-employed, would any fail to claim it.

Certainly the Commission began its review of this aspect of its study by asking whether there needed to be, in the first place, increased indemnities for Members.

We believe it to be true that prior to 1969, when there was a significant increase in Members' remuneration, the Members were drastically underpaid, underserviced, and undervalued. They had been the victims of obsolete notions about the ease and facility with which men of average means could, whatever their talents and qualities, participate in public life. After 1969 it could be said that the extent of remuneration nudged closer to the comparable value of the contribution in time and energy which the M.P.P. gives to his job.


Even so, 1969 was not the millenium, nor is 1973. It is safe to say that no popularly elected representatives will ever be paid salaries equivalent to those received for comparable endeavour in the private sector. Indeed, while the Private Member inhabits the same world and works in the same environment as the civil servants of the Province, most of the latter enjoy larger incomes, broader benefits, better pensions, with

job security in the bargain. This is not to say that civil servants are overpaid, but obviously means to say that, by any comparable measure, the elected politician is underpaid if we consider his basic indemnity and expense allowance as his income.

Based on constant dollar values of annual income calculated in 1969 dollars, the Member's income (including indemnity and tax-free allowance) fell from 18,000 in 1969 to 16,200 in 1972. (See Chart I below.)

CHART I

MPP REMUNERATION IN 1969 DOLLARS



Quite obviously it has continued to fall even more precipitously since then. And since 1969 almost everyone else, surely, has received some upward adjustment in income, including pensioners; it is likely that the only salary- or wage-earners in the land who have not, are the elected politicians in only a few remaining jurisdictions of which Ontario is one.

It is difficult to relate the job of the Member of the Ontario Legislature to other occupations for the purpose of comparing incomes. It is perhaps easier to relate the Member to other Members in comparable jurisdictions.

A Toronto executive alderman, for example, is paid \$28,500 in salary and expenses - higher than the present income of an M.P.P. The Commission maintains that, in minimal terms, a Provincial Member should rank at least equal in status and remuneration to that of a Toronto executive alderman.

This last assertion has been corroborated by the public survey that the Commission conducted (see Appendix). Indeed, it appears from this survey that the public rates M.P.P.s highly. For example, respondents were given eight occupations which they had to rank in order of the service they provide to society. M.P.P.s ranked third, behind M.P.s and medical doctors, but ahead of five other occupations including judges. Following is the complete breakdown of the respondents' ranking:

1. medical doctor
2. M.P. (Ottawa)
3. M.P.P. (Toronto)
4. high school teacher
5. mayor or reeve
6. judge
7. lawyer
8. business executive

If one looks at the ranking of the M.P.P.s alone, the survey shows that 27% of the respondents placed M.P.P.s either first or second, while only 13% placed them in the bottom two ranks.

Some Members have expressed the opinion that, in terms of work-load, their task is greater than that of the Federal Member. It was also suggested to the Commission that Ontario's remuneration for its Provincial Members should be similar to that of either a Federal M.P. or a Quebec M.N.A. The following table showing their present incomes may be interesting:

	<u>Ontario</u>	<u>Ottawa</u>	<u>Quebec</u>
Indemnity	\$12,000	\$18,000	\$15,600
Allowance	<u>6,000</u>	<u>8,000</u>	<u>7,140</u>
TOTAL	\$18,000	\$26,000	\$22,740
NET INCOME (after 1972 taxes)	<u>\$16,020</u>	<u>\$21,823</u>	<u>\$18,997</u>

Plainly, then, compared to those whose work-load relates most clearly to that of the Ontario M.P.P., Ontario Members have been underpaid and, so far as support services and transportation benefits are concerned (as we shall discuss later), Ontario Members have been similarly disadvantaged.

It also seems to the Commission that there may be some similarity between the M.P.P.'s role and that of a person in the "middle-management" ranks of the private sector. While the incomes are comparable the comparison may be misleading, since incomes tend to rise each year for those in the private sector, while this is not so for the M.P.P.

It is estimated, for example, that the average annual salary of persons holding middle-management responsibilities in Ontario is \$17,000, and tends to rise by about \$1,000 a year.

In the last analysis, the determination of appropriate remuneration for a Private Member must turn on consideration as to whether compensation

and benefits are sufficient in themselves to allow the Member to live in reasonable comfort and dignity. There are some, obviously, who may draw upon income from other sources, including another occupation. Still, if the political system is to be open to all aspirants, and if personal wealth or occupation is not to determine whether or not public office can be sought, a key consideration must be that of providing an income which will allow any elected Member to be reasonably self-sufficient.

The Commission, taking all relevant facts into consideration, and considering the total "package" of its proposals affecting Members' incomes, recommends that:

- 1.1 The basic indemnity of the Private Member be increased from \$12,000 to \$15,000 annually; and the tax-free expense allowance of \$6,000 be increased to \$7,500.

It should be clear - at least it is to us - that such an income is neither so large as to be, of itself, an inducement to any to enter politics nor, on the other hand, is it so modest as to demand an unreasonable sacrifice from those who have means yet who are determined to enter public life. This new level of income should also appeal to some who prefer their politicians to be underpaid as testimony to the need for sacrifice in public life - which, it would appear, a few still find reassuring and worthy of re-emphasis.

Over a four-year period (1969-1972) average weekly earnings in Ontario industry increased by 27%.* Our proposal would increase the Member's indemnity and allowance by 25% over his 1969 level. It should also be borne in mind that this new level of remuneration will most certainly be fixed for the immediate future, whereas most salaries will be adjusted annually, at rates of increase which seem to be accelerating.

* Data from the Economic Analysis Branch of the Ministry of Treasury, Economics and Intergovernmental Affairs.

On the two most recent occasions when adjustments were made in Members' remuneration, the increases were made retroactive. In 1965 they became retroactive to April 1, 1964. When increases were again approved in 1969, late in the year, these were made retroactive to April 1 of the same year.

The Commission recommends that:

- 1.2 Increases in indemnities, allowances and salaries, as now proposed and when approved, be made retroactive to April 1, 1973.

Select Committee Allowances

We come immediately to a consideration which, if not resolved, challenges and contradicts the argument that the position of a Member of the Legislative Assembly of Ontario is, for all Members, a full-time occupation, or is becoming one, or at the very least is of such a nature that it prevents all but a very few Members from doing anything else of a productive nature.

If this is so - and it would appear that both the majority of Members and the Ontario public agree it is - then some present practices seem sensible and certain others do not. One practice that seems less sensible, in the context of the "full-time" occupation of the M.P.P., is that of "indemnifying" Members for serving on select committees - a practice, it might be added, unknown to the British or Canadian Parliaments, although it is a feature of some legislatures in Canada. (Alberta, Manitoba, British Columbia and New Brunswick make provision for paying Members who attend committee meetings between sessions.)

The payment of per diems for select committee meetings was first begun in 1919. At that time it was the practice to pay per diems for attendance at any session lasting less than 30 days (in lieu of a lump sum sessional indemnity). The introduction of select committee per diem

allowances seems to have been considered a natural extension of these sessinal allowances. They were paid "for every day upon which he (the Member) is absent from his home in going to, attending at, and returning from meetings of the committee." The allowances were payable only when the committee was meeting in the interval between the two sessions of the Assembly.

In 1947, a Select Committee on Members' Indemnities and Allowances recommended the following changes in select committee payments:

- the per diem amount be raised to \$20 per day. (This was the amount paid as a daily allowance for a short session and the Committee felt there was no reason to pay committee members at a lower rate.)
- in future the allowance be paid also for days (still between sessions) spent away from home on committee business.
- the allowance be not paid for days spent travelling to and from committee meetings, but a mileage allowance be paid for such trips at the rate of 10¢ a mile.

The changes recommended by the 1947 Select Committee were all passed. At the time Attorney General Blackwell noted:

"There is one other change from the report of the Select Committee, and that is allowances for special committees between sessions, instead of being regarded as remuneration at the rate of \$20 a day, are to be plainly on the basis of expenses of \$20 a day, because it will cost the members of these committees that much to come to Toronto and sit on the committees, and that is plainly an expense rather than a pay item."

In 1954 another select committee recommended the following changes:

- the per diem allowance be raised to \$30 per day for committee members and \$35 per day for committee chairmen.
- in the case of inspection tours by select committees, provision be made to pay members' actual transportation costs, including sleeping accommodation.

- the present mileage allowance be discontinued and, in lieu, there be paid to each committee member a travelling allowance of \$20 and his actual disbursements for berths, meals and gratuities for each day spent travelling to and from committee meetings.

In 1968 the statute covering select committee payments was amended to read:

"There shall be paid to each member of a committee of the Assembly other than the chairman thereof an allowance for expenses of \$50, and to the chairman thereof an allowance for expenses of \$60, and

(a) in addition to the allowance provided or in Section 64, his actual disbursements for transportation other than by private automobile or an allowance of 10¢ for every mile travelled by private automobile; and

(b) his actual disbursements for meals, accommodation and gratuities,

for or incurred on every day on which the Assembly is not sitting,

(c) upon which he attends a meeting of the committee; or

(d) upon which he is absent from home and is engaged on the work of the committee; or

(e) upon which he is absent from home and is travelling to and from meetings of the committee."

In 1969 a further clause was added which provided that all the allowances and disbursements in the 1968 amendment be paid to a committee member for each day upon which he was absent from home and the seat of government and was engaged in committee work, whether or not the Assembly was sitting. The reason given for the addition was that Members travelling with select committees would be expected to incur expenses whether or not the House was sitting.

If a Member resident in Windsor, for example, is summoned to a meeting of his select committee at Queen's Park, he may be paid \$50 for getting there, \$50 for attending the meeting, and \$50 for returning to Windsor, assuming that a day is taken for each of these events. In addition he may, as a select committee member, reclaim his disbursements for transportation (travelling however he chooses) and for his meals, accommodation and gratuities. The \$150 he has been paid as his "allowance" is free of tax as, of course, is the reimbursement for expenses.

Select committee fees may be deemed an incentive to Members to accept such responsibility. The Commission has been told frequently that attendance at select committee meetings is significantly more dutiful than is attendance at standing committee meetings where there are no per diems. There may, however, be other reasons for this since standing committees invariably meet while the Legislature is in session and, therefore, at a time when the Member has many competing and conflicting responsibilities. Select committees, at least normally, meet when the House is not sitting and, therefore, Members have more time and fewer conflicts.

Still, it may prove difficult to attract Members to participate in select committee work if the per diems are withdrawn. On the other hand, there has been an increase in select committee activity - and in the expenses for such activity - that seems to have been the result of a logical development in the role of the legislator.

Unquestionably, the select committee function is useful to the legislative process. Nevertheless, this does not suggest that service to a select committee is above and beyond the call of legislative duty.

There seems to be a general concern among Members, and within the Government as well, that select committees are getting somewhat out of hand, and as a consequence their expenditures getting somewhat out of control.

There has been criticism of the increasing mobility and range of these

committees which are, for the first time, travelling beyond Ontario and off the continent. Whether these trips are necessary, and expenditures for them reasonable, is for the Legislature itself to determine and the public, ultimately, to judge. But it is not so easy as that, since the Legislature does not easily criticize or scrutinize itself and, it should also be said, the Government does not feel it has the right to intrude where, quite properly, the Legislature has both the power and the responsibility to govern its own affairs. As for the general public, it would be specious to argue that any sensible judgment could be made as to worth or otherwise when committee activity tends to be ignored by the media, more especially that of the select committees whose proceedings are only rarely controversial and where the conventional adversary relationships among parties and Members tend to be set aside.

The Commission recommends that:

- 1.3 The per diem payments to Members serving on select committees be abolished, and new expense account guidelines be established so that Members travelling with these committees may be fairly reimbursed for expenses incurred.

For attendance at select committee meetings at Queen's Park, the Commission sees no need for special expenses being charged; assuming our later recommendations on travel and accommodation are accepted, they will apply to such attendance.

When select committees travel elsewhere in the Province, in the United States, or abroad, arrangements should be made to allow Members to travel, work, and live in comfortable surroundings comparable, where available, to Ontario standards. Travel arrangements and hotel reservations should be made by the Clerk of the said committee; and reasonable and sufficient per diem rates should be established to compensate Members for meals, teas, taxis, gratuities and nominal out-of-pocket expenses. The per diem rates should be struck during each legislative session by the Standing Committee on Procedure. A present reasonable per diem

rate might be \$30.

Recognizing the frequent confusion and uncertainties in travel, the Commission also recognizes the inherent difficulty - if not the occasional impossibility - in asking Members to collect vouchers and records as they proceed. What seems more important is that ceilings be fixed so the personal expenses of Members do not vary simply because of differences in tastes and habits, and that any possibility of abuse or excess be removed entirely.

Finally, the Commission can see no reason for wives or husbands not accompanying members of committees travelling abroad - indeed it should be encouraged - provided none of their expenses are met out of public funds.

Provincial Boards and Commissions

The Present Situation There are currently 17 M.P.P.s who have been appointed to boards or commissions - 14 Government supporters and three Opposition Members. The Opposition Members are all appointees to advisory committees to parks - Algonquin and Quetico. It appears these latter advisory positions involve little in the way of work or remuneration.

Of the 17 appointments, eight involve work-loads which vary but are not insubstantial, and a defined remuneration ranging from \$2,000 to \$10,000 annually.

An Overview of Agencies of the Ontario Government The "special purpose bodies" aiding the Ontario Government have proliferated over the years. At the present time there are about 300 such agencies.

There is a wide variation in the functions of the bodies and in the degree of government control exerted over them. The following is a system of classification which attempts to sort out the different kinds of

agencies now in existence.

Advisory Committees As the name implies, these committees provide advice (sometimes solicited, sometimes self-generated) to a Minister or to some government body. Appointments may include civil servants, outside persons, or both. The Advisory Committees on Quetico* and Algonquin Parks* and the District Advisory Committees* are the only committees on which M.P.P.s serve which fall in this category.

Boards This second category tends to be composed of bodies more independent than the first. Boards provide a government service or promote a government objective, but from a position more removed than that of a Ministry. They are active in such fields as education, health, welfare, parks and law enforcement, and include the boards of governors of universities, the conservation authorities, and the Ontario Police Commission. The Niagara* and St. Lawrence* Parks Commissions also fall in this category. Appointments to such boards generally come from among non-civil servants.

Corporations These bodies are engaged in activities which resemble or encourage those of a business or commercial nature. They are composed mainly of civil servants. Examples of this kind of corporation include the Crop Insurance Commission, the Stock Yards Board, the Pension Commission*, Ontario Hydro*, the L.C.B.O.*, the Ontario Northland Transportation Commission*, and the Ontario Housing Corporation.

Institutes These engage in research activities and are largely composed of non-civil servants. Included here are O.I.S.E., the Ontario Research Foundation, and the Alcoholism and Drug Addiction Research Foundation. At present, no M.P.P.s sit on institute councils.

Tribunals This last group is involved in activities somewhat judicial in nature. They make judgments based on government policy, or law,

* indicates boards and commissions on which M.P.P.s sit.

or both. Most appointments in this category are from among non-civil servants. Included here are the Ontario Municipal Board, the Environmental Hearing Board*, the Liquor Licence Board of Ontario and the Ontario Highways Commission.

Preliminary Observations

Two generalizations are obvious upon scanning the list of boards and commissions, and upon noting those boards on which M.P.P.s serve.

Firstly, the growth of the practice has been based on "ad hoc" need, and usefulness. This results in considerable variation in (a) who should be appointed, (b) who makes the appointments and reviews them, (c) where or to whom the board reports, (d) the terms of appointments, and (e) the remuneration and expense provisions for appointees.

Secondly, there seems to be no rationale, other than historical occurrence and expediency, for the appointment of M.P.P.s to a few boards and commissions and not to others. For example, as important in terms of funds and "political sensitivity" as Hydro and L.C.B.O. may be, the same case (perhaps a better one) could be made for appointing M.P.P.s to the Ontario Housing Corporation, the Workmen's Compensation Board, or the Ontario Labour Relations Board. Perhaps a key question in one's mind after looking at the situation is whether the practice, if it has great merit, should not be extended substantially. The Commission is not aware of any other parliamentary jurisdiction which uses the practice to the extent of Ontario, if at all.

In examining the appointment of M.P.P.s to provincial agencies, the Commission encountered a number of arguments for and against the practice. While we do not agree with all of them, and consider that some carry much more weight than others, we present them here as an indication of the issues involved.

Arguments in Support of the Practice

- (a) The presence of a politically astute person provides an input to, or a check on, an agency usually at arm's length from public opinion.
- (b) The Member serves as a useful information source for the Legislature, and especially for the Government Caucus.
- (c) It provides a training ground for talented Members.
- (d) It is a means by which the Premier can reward loyal Members of long service, or young ambitious M.P.P.s aiming towards a future Cabinet position.

Criticisms of the Practice

- (a) It gives too much patronage to an executive which already has too much domination in the Legislature - i.e. the rewards keep Backbenchers supplicant and cripple their independence of mind - in the Caucus, the Assembly and its committees.
- (b) The appointees do little or nothing for their rewards and have an unfair advantage in terms of income and perquisites over their colleagues.
- (c) At Ottawa such appointments are never made (but there is, of course, the Senate).
- (d) The appointees have no legislative responsibilities for their agencies - i.e. they do not answer questions in the House, neither do they put through their agency's estimates. They serve an "executive" or "administrative" function, neither of which is consistent with the nature of legislative responsibility.
- (e) The practice conceals a "fat" level of remuneration for Government M.P.P.s which the public doesn't know about.
- (f) As long as a substantial number of such appointments are made and one assumes that "work" is being done by the appointees, the idea that the job of an M.P.P. is a full-time one is undermined.

- (g) There is something anomalous and potentially dangerous in terms of conflict of interest in having an M.P.P. on a board which makes major recommendations after public hearings. As they affect his private interests, such conflicts may be no different from those of any other board member, and would perhaps be covered by a conflict of interest policy of the board. However, as an M.P.P. he has certain political and public interests (e.g. those of his constituency) which may be more difficult or impossible to resolve.

The Commission will subsequently be making recommendations which, if accepted, would step up the work of all Private Members in committees of the Legislature, including more regularized and thorough reviews by such committees of this multitude of provincial agencies, particularly those which are at arm's length from the Ministers.

Therefore, the Commission feels it must recommend that:

- 1.4 The practice of appointing M.P.P.s to permanent boards and commissions be discontinued.

In a further report we shall be making recommendations on the relationship of boards, agencies and commissions to Ministers and to the Legislature.

Severance Allowance

Elected politicians, the world knows, serve at the pleasure of their electors; they enjoy neither tenure nor terms of employment which protect them from arbitrary dismissal. Far from it - arbitrary, peremptory dismissal is part of politics and public service, and everyone in it, or out of it, knows this to be true.

Nevertheless, a Member of the Ontario Legislative Assembly is, when dismissed from office, like anyone else who finds himself out of a job. The important difference between the defeated Member and the dismissed

employee is that the latter will almost certainly enjoy a reasonable period of time when he will have received either unemployment insurance, or separation pay, or both. The Member will have neither, even though he faces the same problems - perhaps more of them - such as an abrupt loss of income with continuing expenses and obligations, the cost of removal from Toronto and his office at Queen's Park, and the cost of job-hunting itself. And, of course, the longer the Member has served before his defeat, the more difficult the re-entry and re-adjustment processes are likely to be.

The Commission proposes:

- 1.5 A Severance Allowance for all Members including Ministers who, as Members of an outgoing Legislature, are unable to contest a general election because their constituencies have ceased to exist as the result of boundary changes, or who, being duly re-nominated by their parties, are subsequently defeated in the general election. Former Members so qualified would receive a Severance Allowance in a lump sum, representing one quarter of their total annual indemnity as a Member, at the rate in effect when the Legislature was dissolved.

EXPENSES

It is important to this and further considerations that the indemnity and the allowance be considered as one - as representing the basic remuneration of the Member. It has been so for a long time, and should be recognized and accepted. The allowance has less and less tended to "offset" the Member's expenses - more and more it has tended to be a part of his salary. Our reading of public and media perceptions of the matter is that the total of indemnity and allowance is the "salary".

It is surely obvious that if the allowance is intended to compensate for the Member's expenses, it compensates some more than others - or, put another way, there is little equity in giving all Members \$6,000 to cover their expenses when some have few expenses, while others could need as much as half the allowance simply to pay their board during the legislative sessions.

Travel

Provisions for a travel allowance were first introduced in the Members' Indemnity Act of 1869, and read as follows:

"There shall be allowed in respect of travel to and from the present session of the Legislative Assembly, to each member ten cents for each mile of the distance between the place of residence of such member, and the City of Toronto, reckoning such distance, going and coming, according to the nearest mail route, which distance shall be determined and certified by the Speaker, and such allowance shall be payable in the manner hereinbefore provided."

The allowance remained substantially unchanged until 1954, when provision was made for four trips per session. In 1969 the Member's mileage provision was increased from 15 to 30 round-trips per annum between his home and Queen's Park, multiplied by 10¢ a mile. Thus, under the present system, a Member from a constituency adjacent to Metro might receive as

little as \$84 for travelling purposes, while another from Northern Ontario would receive more than \$5,000. These amounts, since they represent an allowance for expenses, are tax-free.

The Commission fully realizes that these travel provisions were meant to recognize the disadvantages suffered by the out-of-town Member, and represented an attempt at equity through distance. However, in the context of the various modes of transportation available and the wide difference in their costs, a uniform fee per mile is no longer the most effective way to ensure equity. Furthermore, the Commission feels that the existing provisions overlooked a large area of travel expenses, namely the costs borne by the Member travelling within his own constituency.

The Commission is also dissatisfied with the present arrangement in that it provides unconditional allowances. No attempt is made to satisfy a goal which the Commission considers as important as equity - that of accountability. We believe that as exacting a standard of accountability as possible should apply to travel allowances.

Travel to Queen's Park The Commission feels the Member should be allowed to choose the mode of transportation he wishes to take, and that he should not be unduly constrained by financial impediments. The Member should also be accountable for his travelling. A discussion of the four major modes of transportation available to M.P.P.s follows:

Automobile The present mileage formula applied to car travel is inadequate in its restriction of the number of trips covered. The increased obligation of Members, both at Queen's Park and in their constituencies, lead us to believe the present restriction on the number of trips is unfair.

It was also brought to our attention that the rate per mile allowance (10¢) is too low, which one would suspect is true since the Ontario rate is the lowest in Canada, and since the rate for Ontario civil servants is 15¢ per mile.

The Commission is indebted to the Ontario Provincial Police who provided a detailed study of vehicle operating costs, including those of gas and oil, maintenance, depreciation, insurance and tire cost, and produced an average cost per mile for O.P.P. vehicles of 8.258¢*. Granted that comparison of these costs with private vehicles is not precise (the O.P.P. buys on a tender basis and thus initial costs are lower, for example), it does indicate to the Commission that the present 10¢ rate is reasonable.

The fact that Civil Service rates are 50% higher may indicate only that, when matters of this kind are determined, some interests are represented by bargaining agents and some are not. Nevertheless, the Commission is aware that automobile operating costs are rising and certain to rise further.

The Commission also noted practices elsewhere:

In California, Members of the State Legislature are provided with a gas credit card and a leased car. (Members are required to pay 10% of the cost of the latter.)

In Australia, Members of the Federal Parliament are entitled to low-interest, government-endorsed loans in order to acquire their automobiles.

* During a sample month in 1973 the average costs per mile of an O.P.P. vehicle were as follows:

Gas @ 50¢ per gallon	3.723¢ per mile @ 13.43 m.p.g.
Maintenance	1.416¢ " "
Tire Cost	.299¢ " "
Depreciation	2.255¢ " "
Insurance	.515¢ " "
Add-on costs, oil, etc.	<u>.050¢</u> " "
TOTAL	8.258¢ per mile

In Quebec, Members are allowed up to 15 return journeys during a year, plus one additional journey for each week during which the Assembly holds a sitting. Members are compensated at the rate of 14¢ per mile.

In Great Britain, the Commission found that Members using their automobiles for public business were compensated, provided the claims were made in the prescribed manner.

Members of the Ontario Legislature themselves, while divided almost evenly on the question as to whether or not they should account for such expenses, nevertheless feel, in the majority, dissatisfied with the present travel expense arrangements.

Finally, the Commission gave some thought as to whether or not this travel allowance should also apply to Metro Toronto Members. Our initial reaction was that their situation was similar to that of any other working person and that, for this reason, they should assume their local transportation costs just as any other citizen would. However, most salary-earners are now eligible to claim an employment expense deduction of up to \$150 - a deduction which Members of the Ontario Legislature are not able to claim. If it can be assumed that a substantial portion of the deduction is intended to defray the cost of transportation to and from work, then it would seem reasonable to make some allowance to defray those transportation costs for Metro Members.

The Commission therefore recommends, for both Metro and non-Metro Members, that:

- 1.6 All Members be reimbursed at the rate of 10¢ a mile for all automobile mileage incurred in travelling between Queen's Park and their homes while on legislative or constituency business. In order to claim reimbursement the Member must submit a signed statement specifying the mileage and number of trips made, such statements to be filed every two months of the calendar year, within 90 days of the expense being incurred.

- 1.7 The automobile allowance of 10¢ a mile stand only for the current year, and be increased by 1¢ next year (1974-75) and each year thereafter until the per mile allowance stands at 15¢, after which we have no doubt the entire matter will again need to be reviewed.

The Commission concludes there is a better way of compensating Members for the cost of their transportation while attending the public's business than the existing one. To subsidize the Member with a tax-free allowance based on the distance the Member lives from Queen's Park seems akin to the practice of paying maharajas according to their weight. We are not yet certain we have found the ultimate answer, but merely one that should suffice for the present.

Air Considering the sheer physical size of Ontario and the sophistication of its present transportation systems, financial constraints have meant that Ontario's legislators have been the last to benefit from the new, more convenient, comfortable and efficient means of travel. They deserve better. No industry or agency in the Province would have maintained for so long a time such a primitive and restrictive concept of travel. After all, air travel is fully utilized by the Ministry and by civil servants; it only awaits discovery by the Members of the Legislative Assembly.

In a previous study undertaken for the Ontario Government in 1969, it was recommended that: "The whole area of travel allowances be revised ... the Member be allowed to choose the most effective means of transportation, with the financial limitation being the cost of that means of transportation which is the fastest ... normally transport by air for distant points, and automobile for closer ones."

For whatever reason, no significant changes were made in Members' travel arrangements although, anomalously, a Member travelling to or from his home and Queen's Park for the purpose of attending a meeting of a select committee may travel by air and expense the cost to the select

committee.

The Commission has noted the air travel services made available to Federal Members of Parliament:

- (a) Federal Members are entitled to one round-trip weekly, Economy Class, between Ottawa and their constituency or place of residence.
- (b) Federal Members are entitled to 10 round-trips in each period of 12 consecutive months, to any place in Canada from Ottawa, or from their place of residence.*
- (c) Wives of Federal Members are entitled to six round-trips in each period of 12 consecutive months, between their constituency or place of residence and Ottawa.*

* Trips (b) and (c) are deductible from (a)

Further, the Commission was impressed by the recommendations in the Boyle Report (Great Britain) on Members' and Ministers' Remuneration. In the so-called "Mother of Parliaments" - and surely the most conservative with respect to such matters as remuneration - Members of Parliament, in the course of performing their duties, are allowed travel expenses by whatever means they wish to travel, including travel by air, First Class.

In addition, it was Lord Boyle's recommendation that "free travelling facilities by air, rail or sea, public transport should be provided for wives and husbands of Members for up to 10 return journeys a year in total between Westminster and the Member's constituency ..."

With these factors in mind, the Commission recommends that:

- 1.8 Members residing in communities distant from Queen's Park which have, or are accessible to, airports serviced by public carriers with scheduled services, be allowed 52 round-trip Economy flights per year, included among these being four round-trip flights for the Member's wife or husband. Reimbursement on presentation of vouchers, the latter to be filed every two months of the calendar year, within 90 days of the expenses being incurred.

Train There remain some Members who will continue to travel by train between their homes and their offices at Queen's Park. It does seem, in the name of consistency and common sense, that Members should be allowed recompense for any such travel by rail, on any train, including berth and meals as required. Whether or not this should depend, in part, upon the favour of the railroads who have heretofore provided passes, is a moot question. Bearing in mind the present sensitivity and concern expressed in many quarters regarding possible conflicts of interest, the Commission recommends that:

- 1.9 All Members of the Legislative Assembly travelling by train between their homes and Queen's Park on legislative or constituency business do so at the public's expense, and not as a matter of courtesy of the railroads. In addition, wives of Members be allowed up to four return train trips between Queen's Park and their homes. Reimbursement on presentation of vouchers covering the costs of First Class fare, meals and berths in connection with such travel, filed every two months of the calendar year, within 90 days of the expenses being incurred.

Bus Where bus transportation is available to the Member as the most direct and efficient means of travel between his home and Queen's Park, it seems sensible to allow him to use such services.

The Commission recommends that:

- 1.10 Bus transportation be made available to Members travelling between their homes and Queen's Park on legislative or constituency business. Reimbursement on presentation of vouchers submitted every two months of the calendar year, within 90 days of the expenses being incurred.

Constituency Travel We have already pointed out in the introductory paragraph of this travel section, that an important area not covered by present provisions is that of travel by the Member within his constituency. In order to serve his constituents' needs adequately, a Member

must keep in touch with both individuals and communities in his riding, and gain first-hand knowledge of their views and their problems. This obviously entails a great deal of travelling, especially if the riding is of any significant size. One Member estimated, for example, that he felt obliged to travel some 75,000 miles over a two-year period, using his own car, and without any compensation. It is, he told the Commission, the only way he can cover his riding which, like several others, is considerably larger in physical dimensions than most.

The Commission recommends that:

- 1.11 The cost of a Member's travel within his constituency by train, bus, or automobile, where such travel is undertaken in connection with his role as a Member of the Legislature, be reimbursed on the same basis as travel between his home and Queen's Park.

Certain Members representing extreme Northern constituencies are faced with a particular problem. Their ridings are so vast, and the road transport so skeletal, that some permanent communities can only be reached by chartered aircraft.

There has been discussion recently in the Legislature and in the press suggesting that M.P.P.s of interland ridings in the North should have the right, on request and when aircraft are available, to use the Provincial Air Service to cover their constituencies.

This we would not recommend. It would put both officials of the Air Service and M.P.P.s in an invidious position vis-a-vis each other.

We make the following recommendation, aware that the current representation by Ministers in two of these gigantic ridings - i.e. two men who have priority of access to the Provincial Air Service - has no bearing on the need for a general recommendation.

The Commission recommends that:

- 1.12 Members representing Cochrane North, Kenora, Rainy River, and Thunder Bay, each of which has a number of permanent communities only reachable by air carriers of non-scheduled airlines, be entitled to reimbursement to a maximum of \$2,500 a year for flights necessary to reach any of these communities. Vouchers for such flights to be submitted every two months in the calendar year, within 90 days of the expenses being incurred.

It is obvious that this recommendation is made in the context of present electoral boundaries. Should these boundaries change, we would expect the recommendation to be reviewed.

Air Travel Within Ontario The Commission was impressed by the following observations by Lord Boyle in the First Report of the Review Body on Top Salaries, Ministers of the Crown and Members of Parliament (Great Britain):

"An increasing number of Members incur expenses in travelling outside their constituencies, both within the United Kingdom and overseas, to inform themselves on subjects of relevance to their work. These are generally not even deductible for tax. We consider that such travel should be encouraged where it can be shown to be of assistance to Members in carrying out their duties effectively. We have in mind, for example, visits in connection with the sponsoring of a Private Bill, to extend a Member's knowledge of an industry which is of special importance in his constituency, and, in the case of Opposition spokesmen, to examine matters of national interest in the sphere for which they are responsible."

The Commission shares these sentiments. We believe Ontario's legislators have a right to reasonable travel assistance, not only to allow them to travel between their ridings and their offices at Queen's Park as expeditiously as possible, but they also have a right to travel throughout the Province on occasion, to see things at first hand, or to pursue their special legislative interest in public matters, so they may

make themselves at least as astute and informed as their critics so often believe themselves to be.

Therefore, the Commission recommends that:

- 1.13 All Members be entitled to six return trips by air from Queen's Park or their own riding, to any destination in Ontario in each calendar year. Reimbursement on presentation of vouchers submitted every two months in the calendar year, within 90 days of the expenses being incurred.

The Commission has estimated that the cost of providing those six round-trip flights within Ontario for 117 Members, assuming maximum use and an average cost of \$60 per return trip, would be around \$42,120 annually, based on current tariffs.

All our recommendations on travel expenses have made reference to the fact that, in order to be compensated, a Member must submit vouchers. We would like to elaborate on this point. We submit that each Member should be required to fill out a travel expense claim in which he enters each trip he has taken, and specifies for each one, the cost, destination and purpose. In the case of bus, train and air travel, the ticket stub or appropriate voucher should accompany the claim. We recognize, however, that Members whose constituency perimeter is quite small (e.g. a City of Ottawa Member) will have difficulty filling out such a detailed statement for constituency travel. We suggest that administrative guidelines be set up for such Members, to enable them to submit a more general description of their travelling.

Accommodation

It should be stressed here that before 1969, when the last adjustments were made in Members' pay and allowances, Members living outside Metropolitan Toronto received an additional allowance of \$1,000, which was to cover part of their expenses for board and travel. In 1969,

however, the \$1,000 differential was removed, while the Member's mileage allowance was increased. Commenting on this aspect of the revised schedules of Members' incomes, the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Robert Nixon) said:

"There is another matter that I want to bring to your attention, sir, and that is the disparity in costs that members must meet to travel some considerable distance to the Legislature. I was comparing those costs of the members in the immediate vicinity of these buildings, particularly in Metropolitan Toronto, and in the immediate constituencies around Toronto. We made an attempt in the last indemnity bill to make up for this disparity by including a \$1,000 allowance that was payable to those members outside Toronto.

"There were arguments both ways. I have heard members from Toronto say that their costs are equally high by the time they provided for their constituencies through offices and so on. But I am still, perhaps, a bit biased, being a member from outside of town. I would say to you, sir, that in my opinion there are more expenses associated with a constituency removed from Toronto, compared with those that are payable by a Toronto member.

"These have not been accounted for in the bill, other than for the provision of the travel allowance which, at least in part, makes up for this difference in cost responsibility. I do not know what the answer to the problem would be. I know many people considered the possibility of some differences in indemnity or expenses, but still this bill gives a flat indemnity and the same expense allowance to members whatever their constituency or wherever their constituency is located."

Following the Leader of the Opposition in the debate, the Leader of the New Democratic Party (Mr. Donald C. MacDonald) also commented on the abandonment of the differential:

"... in one respect, this bill is a step back rather than a step forward. This is in terms of acknowledging the fact that certain members of the Legislature who are not what I would describe as commuting members, living either in Metro or close enough that they can drive, those members of the Legislature obviously have higher expenses than those of us who are commuting members.

"I know one can make a case that urban members have particular kinds of costs and particular kinds of problems that counter-balance, but I am not going to enter into that. I think the

people who live at a distance obviously have higher expenditures.

"In the last amendments to The Legislative Assembly Act, we made a gesture in the direction of acknowledging this - the difference between \$4,000 and \$3,000 for expenses for the out-of-town members and the Metropolitan members. There were offensive features to that and I do not think one needs to detail them. Therefore, they have been dropped altogether.

"But it simply means, Mr. Speaker, that we have admitted to ourselves and to the public that we have been incapable of coming up with some sort of a formula that acknowledges the greater costs of those who are non-commuting members."

Granted that the views of Members on issues relating to their own remuneration are often self-conscious in their expression, the Commission met none who disagreed with the fundamental problem in the present arrangements with respect to expenses - that most of the out-of-town or "non-commuting" Members are financially disadvantaged as compared to those representing Metropolitan constituencies.

There is no question that, in the present system, the out-of-town Member in effect is paid less for the same job - that for him there is a direct cost in connection with his representational tasks that is not incurred by many of his legislative colleagues. These costs include hotel expenses, travel, taxis, and the variety of out-of-pocket expenses which recur to those who must live a good part of their lives away from home, in hotels, rooming houses or apartments.

It has been said by some that the Metro Members who live at home also have expenses and that these are of an unusual kind, such as more frequent donations to charities, a greater amount of social-political entertaining, and more involvement in community endeavours which tax both the Member's time and his income.

While convinced that this is so, the Commission is also convinced that the expenses presently borne by out-of-town Members are inequitable, substantial and unavoidable; and that most of the expenses borne by

Metro Members are neither.

So saying, we cannot resist giving expression to this irony which confronts citizens in public life whose constituents fully expect them to be patrons of the arts, subscribers to every worthy cause, tithers to the church, and benefactors to every charity; but who resent their having even a modest increase in income, and seemingly would prefer them to be perpetually dunned and chronically underpaid.

With these factors in mind, the Commission recommends that:

- 1.14 All Members of the Legislature, except those representing the 26 constituencies within the Toronto Metropolitan area, and excepting also the Premier, Ministers of the Crown, Mr. Speaker, the Leader of the Official Opposition and the Leader of the Third Party, be entitled to claim for their expenses associated with accommodation within Toronto, up to the maximum amount of \$3,000 in each calendar year, provided all such claims are submitted with proper vouchers or other reasonable proof of expenditure; and, further, provided such claims are made for each period of two months, within 90 days of the expense being incurred.

The Commission emphasizes again the importance of accountability in benefits of this kind. It is true, as some will say, that Members must keep proper records of their expenses, which they were not obliged to do before. But there is surely no novelty in elected politicians assuming obligations in the same manner, and for the same reasons, as their constituents. Anyway, if there are Members who find the "book-keeping" distasteful, they need not keep records nor recover the expenses. It is the Commission's strong view that if a more reasonable equity is to be achieved in these various items of Members' costs and expenses, it can only be done fairly and effectively if equity and accountability go hand in hand.

Stationery

It has obviously been the Commission's intent to identify the range of Members' expenses and, where possible, to establish the principle of accountability. It has been the practice for many years to grant each Member a stationery allowance. The amount of this allowance is fixed sessionally on the recommendation of the Standing Committee on Procedure. For the 1972 session, the stationery allowance was \$600.

After the amount has been established, the Accounts Branch of the Ministry of Government Services forwards to the Legislative Accountant a list showing the amount of stationery advances to Members, based on orders placed through the Ministry of Government Services. This amount, then, is deducted from the Stationery Allowance and a cheque for the balance of the full allowance is forwarded to the Member.

No Member has been known to "overdraw" his stationery account. Most Members, in fact, receive the full amount although, it is obvious, this hardly means they have gone without stationery. Often, the party caucus offices provide their Members with stationery supplies, the costs of those supplies being taken out of the caucus allocation funds. As a generality, it could be said that the stationery allowance, like the mileage allowance, is tax-free money in the hands of the Member and comes to be considered as income, not as compensation for an expense.*

Some have said the stationery allowance affords the opportunity for more direct mail into the constituency, or that the allowance is used, in part, to cover the annual cost of Christmas cards. Another recipient said he had used a stationery allowance cheque to pay for a 12-gauge shot-gun.

* A select committee of the Legislature recommended as early as 1947 that the stationery allowance be discontinued. For reasons unknown no action was taken on this recommendation.

It is not easy to determine precisely why or how these perquisites become embedded in the system; presumably they are the result of some sensible initiative to provide a service deemed to be essential. But long after the established procedures have been superseded by others, more efficient and perhaps more economical, the perquisite remains - possibly maintained because it now serves another purpose.

The Commission has concluded that the stationery allowance is one such allowance, which ultimately does not serve the purpose presumed for it but serves another just as well. The other purpose, broadly speaking, is that such allowances effectively increase the income of the Member, without offering further provocation to the media and to the general public.

The Commission recommends that:

- 1.15 The stationery allowance be eliminated and Members' stationery supplies be provided on a charge-back basis under the Speaker's votes.

Conditions for Withholding Allowances

None of the proposed allowances will be available to Members on the day following the writ for a general election, and henceforth until the Members have taken their seats in the next Parliament.

Constituency Mailings

Members are entitled at present to one free household mailing within their constituency per year. A number of Members have expressed the opinion that this should be increased. The Commission believes this is a reasonable request since it should result in improved communication between the Members and their constituencies.

The Commission recommends that:

- 1.16 All Members be entitled to two free household mailings annually from Queen's Park to their constituencies.

Fees Office

The Commission is strongly of the view that the necessary degree of accountability with respect to various expenses and allowances, to which Members would be entitled under our recommendations, can best be achieved through the Office of the Speaker. We believe that accountability with respect to these matters cannot be achieved satisfactorily through a Government department.

Expense accounts submitted by Members for their living allowances in Toronto, for example, or their automobile travel, or expense claims for transportation, or for travel on select committees - all these should be properly submitted, properly scrutinized and, where there are errors, misunderstandings or improprieties, they should be dealt with under the authority of Mr. Speaker, and not through a Minister or an employee of a Government department.

The Commission recommends that:

- 1.17 A fees Office be established in the Speaker's Office, staffed by accountants who will be officials of the Speaker's establishment and thus independent of the Ministry. The Fees Office shall have the sole responsibility of processing and approving for payment all expense claims of the Members, including Members who are Ministers, except Ministry expenses relating to specific departments.

Members do complain about the decline of the Legislature as an institution of unchallenged strength and independence. It has become a common complaint in most parliaments and legislatures and it has, as

well, been commonly assumed that the encroaching powers of the Executive and of the Civil Service have been prime contributors to this decline.

Notwithstanding, there is evidence to suggest that the Members themselves must assume the blame for some of this "decline" in the prestige of the Legislature. They have been neither jealous enough of their rights nor zealous enough in standing up for them.

It seems to the Commission of paramount importance that the Executive render unto the Members that which is their own, which includes the responsibility of the Members to regulate their own affairs, apply their own standards, and assert their authority in matters which are clearly their responsibility. However, the Commission senses that the Executive has not so often seized such authority as it has simply occupied ground which the Members have abandoned. As seems to be the case with some expenditures by select committees where matters have been set adrift, there is seeming indifference on the part of the Legislature on the one hand and reluctance on the other hand on the part of the Government to intervene and assert its concern.

Basic to sustaining the independence and integrity of the Legislature is, in our opinion, the maintenance of the power and authority of the Office of the Speaker, the prestige of that Office, and the independence and status given those who are associated with it - namely the Clerk, the Legislative Librarian and, as we propose, the Legislative Fees Office.

In later reports the Commission will deal further with this subject. For the present it should be clear that, within the ambit of its terms of reference, the Commission has found grounds for concern with the erosion of the Speaker's powers and in the vital relationships between the Speaker's Office and Members.

Through the understandable zeal for order and systematic function,

the Ministry of Government Services has assumed responsibility for providing certain services to Members - such as that of processing their expense claims, and of administering the Legislative Library. The Commission would make a plea that very great care be taken for the traditions of the Legislature, and for independence of the Office of the Speaker, and that the drive for efficiency not be so great as to shunt aside customs and practices which have not only served the political system in the past, but have allowed it to survive and take root in the public confidence.

It seems to us a danger of the system - and certainly a departure from its tenets - to oblige Private Members to account for themselves to a Minister whose prime duty and responsibility is to the Executive. It is a bad precedent and could become a ruinous practice. At best, the Executive - or those directly accountable to it - could have a natural reluctance to question Members' expenses, even though questions are begging; and, at worst, the Executive might find it impossible to deal with all Members with an even hand.

The genius of the parliamentary system has been the development of the role and function of the Speaker, and no democratic legislature can function effectively without recognition of the Speaker's authority, integrity, and independence. It is sometimes difficult to impress this upon those who construct models and flow-charts based upon other priorities, such as efficiency, or to impress this upon a Ministry which simply wants to "get the job done", as it were. It is also difficult to impress these considerations upon senior civil servants, whose fundamental concerns are those of the Ministry.

But the virtues of efficiency, administrative neatness or whatever, are not so absolute as to compensate for the emasculation of an essential institution in the parliamentary process. It is not enough to say that administrative intentions are strictly honourable - as they doubtlessly are - or to demonstrate how much better the Ministry can deliver a service than can the Office of the Speaker. The answer is - if the assertion

be true - to improve the Speaker's Office so it can deliver the service, not to truncate its power by weakening its influence.

It is enough to say, at this stage, that the Commission believes the establishment of the Fees Office under the direct authority of Mr. Speaker, for the purposes designated in this Report, is basic to the whole thrust of our proposals, and an essential condition to any acceptance of the principle of accountability.

Publishing of Members' Expenses

The safeguards against any abuses of these recommendations are (a) accountability and (b) disclosure.

The Commission believes the principle of accountability itself will serve as a restraint in the event such is needed. However, we propose that a further deterrent be added in a system of disclosure and recommend that:

- 1.18 Annual reports be published in Hansard of all Members' compensated expenses incurred under the provisions of Recommendations 1.6 to 1.15. Expenses be listed under categories of expenditure for each Member.

Summary

The mileage allowances distributed some \$87,500 among most of the Members; the stationery allowance distributed a further \$70,200 among all the Members. Both of these allowances have been free of tax, and no accountability was required.

We are not, in saying so, seeking to add to the tribulations of our legislators. We are, however, pleading for public understanding in a much misunderstood issue. Members, as we have said, have a wholly uncharacteristic difficulty in speaking to matters which directly affect

their self-interest. Yet they have been historically underpaid, and unnecessarily so, through a long period when politics and public service were deemed a suitable avocation for gentlemen - and wealthy ones - and compensation was not supposed to matter. The general public has been indoctrinated throughout the history of legislatures to believe that elected politicians, like clergymen, must look for their compensation in heaven.

This issue is made more difficult by the inevitable political opportunists who are themselves invariably sufficiently affluent to join in the protest against improving the lot of their colleagues.

There are those who know nothing of the life of the legislator but who profess to have an instant understanding of his worth - which is negligible - and who lead the cry of protest when the public man, at rare intervals, seeks to adjust his income to that of the rest of society. There are also others who do know better but who join in the general clamor anyway, presumably because it has always been fashionable.

None of this is helped much by the fiction of the "indemnity" which is a word rich in traditional significance but impoverished in its contemporary relevance. The reality, today, is that the indemnity no longer adequately indemnifies and, in order that this not be too great a disincentive, governments and legislatures have adopted a wide range of supplementary benefits, clinging to the concept of the "indemnity" even while driven to making endless concessions to its inadequacy. Until rescued by a new maturity among the public, and from among the public savants, they will go on doing so.

SPECIAL POSITIONS

The Commission, it will be recalled, has supported the view expressed by a number of Members that the appointment of Private Members to serve as paid officers on government boards and commissions should be discouraged. But the Commission also proposes that the number of paid officers of the House be increased, and the salaries of present officers also be increased.

The Speaker

In its deliberate effort to elevate the Office of the Speaker and to re-enforce its status and independence, the Commission recommends that:

- 1.19 The Speaker, in addition to his indemnity and tax-free allowance as a Member, be paid a further salary of \$9,000, and a further tax-free representational allowance of \$2,000.

This allowance is not to be confused with, or considered a substitute for, the annual contingency fund voted Mr. Speaker for fulfilment of financial obligations in connection with his Office (e.g. official entertaining). The \$3,000 accommodation allowance proposed for out-of-town Members would not be taken up by the Speaker so long as he occupies the quarters presently reserved for him in the Legislature.

In addition, we recommend that:

- 1.20 The Speaker be entitled to the use of a Government limousine and driver.

It may need to be pointed out here that the Speaker, in addition to his responsibilities in the House, has also the duties and functions of his Office and staff to oversee, over which he must have full authority.

Additional Officers of the House

As for the other important officers of the Legislature, the Commission recommends the following salaries (the amounts in parentheses are the present salaries):

	<u>Per Session</u>	
1.21 Deputy Speaker, Chairman of the Committees of the Whole House	\$5,000	(\$4,000)
Deputy Chairman of the Committees of the Whole House	\$3,000	(\$2,000)
Chairman of Standing Committees	\$2,000	(\$1,000)

It has been noted by the Commission that there have been some standing committees established, with chairmen and members appointed, which have not met or have met only on rare occasions.

The Commission recommends that:

- 1.22 Chairmen of standing committees should not be paid a salary unless their committees do meet and report formally to the Legislature.

With regard to chairmen of select committees, the Commission recommends that:

- 1.23 Members serving as chairmen of select committees be paid for each sitting day a sum of \$50, or an annual salary of \$2,000, whichever is the lesser.

Party Whips

It is the feeling of the Commission, encouraged by opinion among the Members, that more emphasis and importance should be attached to the function of the party whips, even more so in view of the increasing importance of committee work, both standing and select. The whips play a

truly valuable role in the parliamentary process by maintaining communications between and among the party leadership, the front benches, and the Private Members.

We recommend that:

- 1.24 The number of Government Whips be increased from a total of three to a total of five, including the Chief Government Whip and the Deputy Government Whip; in addition to the Official Opposition Chief Whip, two other whips be allowed for the Official Opposition; one Chief Whip and one additional whip be provided for the Third Party.

In recognition of the increasing importance of the role of whips in the Legislature, their importance to the legislative process and to the operations of the parties in the Legislature, the Commission recommends:

- 1.25 Increased salaries as follows (existing salaries are in parentheses):

	<u>Per Session</u>	
Chief Government Whip	\$5,000	(\$2,000)
Deputy Government Whip	\$3,000	(\$1,000)
Government Whips (3)	\$2,000	
Official Opposition Chief Whip	\$3,000	(\$1,000)
Official Opposition Whips (2)	\$2,000	
Third Party Chief Whip	\$2,500	
Third Party Whip (1)	\$2,000	

It is also part of the Commission's responsibility to make recommendations in this Report with respect to salaries and allowances for the Ministry, the Leader of the Opposition, and the Leader of the Third Party in the Legislature.

Leader of the Official Opposition

Previous schedules have established the salary of the Leader of the

Official Opposition at the same level as salaries for Ministers of the Government with portfolios. This recognizes the burdensome, although different, responsibilities of that Office and its importance to the legislative process. We propose that:

- 1.26 In addition to his indemnity and tax-free allowance as a Member, the Leader of the Official Opposition be entitled to a salary of \$18,000 per annum.

With respect to expense and accommodation allowances, the Commission feels the requirements of the Leader of the Official Opposition are unique and extraordinary. We therefore recommend that:

- 1.27 The Leader of the Official Opposition be entitled to an accommodation allowance of \$6,000 (vouchered) where his permanent residence is outside Metro Toronto, and in addition to a special tax-free representation allowance of \$3,000.

Leader of the Third Party

The Ontario Legislature recognizes the leaders of other parties holding more than 12 seats in the House. The Commission proposes that:

- 1.28 In addition to his indemnity and tax-free allowance as a Member, the Leader of the Third Party receive an annual salary of \$5,000, a non-taxable representation allowance of \$1,500, and up to \$6,000 accommodation allowance (vouchered) where his principal residence is outside Metro Toronto.

In addition, the Commission feels that past experience indicates it would be appropriate and in the general interest of all concerned to provide both the Leader of the Official Opposition and the Leader of the Third Party with certain services presently enjoyed by members of the Ministry.

The Commission recommends that:

- 1.29 The Leader of the Official Opposition and the Leader of the Third Party each be entitled to the use of a Government limousine and driver during sessions.

THE MINISTRY

The administrative responsibility borne by a Minister suggests that his total income should be compared to income for senior personnel in industry, universities, the professions and municipalities. The Commission has reviewed these areas and offers the following comments.

Universities The Commission received a survey covering eleven presidents of universities in Ontario, exclusive of the University of Toronto. The survey showed that, in addition to salary, most presidents receive the use of a house at nominal cost and, although expected to use this house for official entertaining, it certainly represents a valuable personal benefit. As a rough estimate, we have assumed the house to be worth \$5,000 a year and we have included as additional income the difference between this amount and any rent paid. On this basis the average total income of the eleven presidents is \$47,500.

We feel the office of university president is particularly appropriate for comparison with a Minister of the Ontario Cabinet since it is now recognized as being a relatively short-term appointment, say seven to ten years, and there is also the corresponding element of public service and a comparable burden of responsibility in an institution devoid of the profit motive.

Self-Employed Professionals In this investigation the latest available income tax statistics, which are for the year 1969, were used. These figures have been brought up-to-date by applying an increase factor

of 25% for a three-year period. This factor was used after a consideration of the rise in incomes of other segments of the population, such as average weekly earnings in manufacturing industries, available from Statistics Canada; and executive incomes, available from the study mentioned in the following section. On this basis, it is estimated that the average earnings of self-employed doctors and surgeons are approximately \$40,500 a year. Similarly, self-employed lawyers would average \$32,400, engineers and architects \$28,300 and dentists \$27,200. We have seen current estimates of average doctors' incomes of approximately \$42,000, which seems to be in line with projections.

Top Executives in Canadian Industry In an attempt to quantify average incomes, the Commission reviewed a survey, based on over 700 completed questionnaires covering the years 1971 and 1972, for executives in businesses with sales volumes of \$1,000,000 or more. This survey included averages and ranges for the top executive (president) and for a "senior management" group, and gave figures separately for Ontario and other regions.

In Ontario, the average salary of the presidents covered by the survey was \$39,900, although in Quebec it was \$44,100. In addition, year-end bonuses averaged \$10,000 in Ontario, to give a total income of approximately \$50,000. (The total income for Quebec was \$52,700.)

For the "senior management" group, salaries were approximately \$25,000 in Ontario and \$26,000 in Quebec. Estimated year-end bonuses in the range of \$4,000-\$5,000 bring the Ontario average to somewhat less than \$30,000, with the corresponding figure for Quebec being in excess of \$30,000.

The comparison with Quebec is mentioned since the Commission was surprised to find consistently higher executive salaries there than in Ontario. Statistics on hourly and weekly wages, published by Statistics Canada, show lower wages in Quebec than in Ontario.

From the range of salaries shown it can be said that the top 10% of presidents in Ontario earn a salary of \$60,000 or more, with other senior management executives being paid approximately 60% of the salary of the president. To these figures may be added year-end bonuses of approximately \$5,000, to give total incomes for senior management in excess of \$40,000 for the top 10%.

Civil Service The salaries of Deputy Ministers offer a further comparison, and these range from \$34,650 to \$44,100.

Summary The following table summarizes the salary amounts described above. Consideration of ministerial salaries will, of course, take the following into account:

- the basic level set for all M.P.P.s
- the degree of financial loss which can be expected of a Minister in comparison to the income he might earn privately, bearing in mind the recently imposed conflict of interest guidelines.

TABLE 2

1972 AVERAGE SALARIES FOR SENIOR PERSONNEL

(Industry, Universities and the Professions)

University Presidents \$47,500 salary and accommodation

Self-Employed Professions

Estimated Average 1972

- doctors	\$40,000 - \$42,000	net income
- lawyers	\$32,000 - \$34,000	
- engineers)		
architects)		
dentists)	\$27,000 - \$30,000	

Chairmen of Provincial Commissions \$29,400 - \$40,950 salary

Civil Service, Deputy Minister \$34,650 - \$44,100 salary

Top Executives in Ontario Industry

- president	\$50,000	salary and bonus
- senior management, top 10%	\$42,000	salary and bonus
- " " top 25%	\$33,000	salary and bonus
- " " average	\$29,000	salary and bonus

Ministers

The function and responsibility of Members of the Ministry are more clearly defined and thus more clearly perceived than those of the Private Member. It is, therefore, somewhat easier to strike appropriate salary ranges. Most would agree that Ministers should be paid salaries comparable to those paid to the senior personnel in their own employ, or salaries paid to executives in upper management levels in the business community having comparable administrative responsibilities.

It has been suggested that ministerial salaries should be tied to those in the Civil Service. To do so, the Commission feels, runs the risk of creating the appearance of a conflict of interest. It surely would be undesirable that the Ministry negotiate pay rates for the Civil Service knowing that, at the same time, ministerial salaries were being determined automatically.

This is a sometime source of grievance for Ministers who much accept complete responsibility for their departments, yet who receive less in salary than do the deputies responsible to them. Nevertheless, material reward and self-advancement are not essential considerations to a political career and this adjuration persists in the public mind.

At present, salaries for Ontario Cabinet Ministers with portfolios (and without, for that matter) are less than those of either Quebec or Ottawa:

Quebec Cabinet Minister - indemnity and salary	\$31,200
allowance	<u>\$10,200</u>
TOTAL	<u>\$41,400</u>
Federal Cabinet Minister - indemnity and salary	\$33,000
- allowance	<u>\$ 8,000</u>
TOTAL	<u>\$41,000</u>
Ontario Cabinet Minister - indemnity and salary	\$27,000
allowances	<u>\$ 8,000</u>
TOTAL	<u>\$35,000</u>

The Commission proposes that:

- 1.30 In addition to his indemnity and tax-free allowance as a Member, a Minister with portfolio receive an annual salary of \$18,000.

The Commission recommends that the \$2,000 representation allowance previously allowed Ministers be discontinued. However, the Commission recognizes the fact that Ministers whose permanent residence is outside Toronto will, as a result of their being Ministers, be obliged to establish permanent residence in Toronto. Most Ministers who are not from Toronto are required to maintain two permanent domiciles. The permanent character of their accommodation in Toronto, which is quite different from that of Private Members, represents for most of them a substantial expense.

It will be recalled that the Commission has recommended an accommodation allowance of \$3,000 for out-of-town Members, payable when supported by vouchers. The Commission further recommends that:

- 1.31 Ministers, with principal residence outside of Metropolitan Toronto, be allowed an accommodation allowance up to \$6,000, such expenditures to be accounted for by appropriate vouchers.

Ministers without Portfolio

With respect to Ministers without Portfolio, the Commission recommends that:

- 1.32 In addition to his indemnity and tax-free allowance as a Member, the salary of a Minister without Portfolio be increased from \$5,000 to \$7,500; but, since these Ministers do not have specific departmental responsibilities requiring them to live in Toronto, we do not propose an increased accommodation allowance in their case.

Parliamentary Assistants

The role and function of Parliamentary Assistants is presently passing through its initial stages in the Ontario Legislature. The position of Parliamentary Assistant seems to be recognized by Members on all sides as being an appropriate office for encouraging the development of ministerial talent and for broadening the participation of Government Members in the policy-forming and legislative process.

The Commission reports this affirmative view of these parliamentary positions in order that its recommendation not be misunderstood. We believe the present salary of \$5,000 as established for Parliamentary Assistants (and which is equal to that of the Chairman of the Committees of the Whole House and Deputy Speaker, and the Chief Government Whip) to be adequate for the present time.

We therefore recommend that:

- 1.33 In addition to his indemnity and tax-free allowance as a Member, the salary of a Parliamentary Assistant remain at \$5,000; but that he receive compensation from his Ministry for expenses incurred in pursuit of his responsibilities.

The Premier of Ontario

With respect to the Premier, the Commission proposes that:

- 1.34 In addition to his indemnity and tax-free allowance as a Member, the First Minister receive an annual salary of \$25,000, and a non-taxable representation allowance of \$4,500, and up to \$6,000 accommodation allowance (vouchered) where his permanent residence is outside Metro Toronto.

The income of the Premier of Ontario would then compare as follows with those of the Prime Minister of Canada and the Premier of Quebec:

Prime Minister of Canada -	indemnity and salary	\$43,000
	allowance	<u>10,000</u>
	TOTAL	<u>\$53,000</u>
Premier of Quebec -	indemnity and salary	\$36,400
	allowance	<u>11,220</u>
	TOTAL	<u>\$47,620</u>
Premier of Ontario-	indemnity and salary	\$40,000
	allowance	<u>12,000</u>
	TOTAL	<u>\$52,000</u>

It should be noted that the Prime Minister of Canada has an official residence, while the Premier of Ontario does not.

All three First Ministers are supplied with Government cars and drivers, as well as the use of Government-operated aircraft on request.

It hardly seems necessary to stress the substantial burdens borne by the First Minister of a Government in a Province such as Ontario. Nevertheless, even the increased salary recommended by the Commission is not significantly greater than the annual salaries of certain elected municipal officials in the Province, and it is less than that of some university presidents.

There does not seem to be any exception to the rule in the parliamentary system that the First Minister is entitled to a significantly greater salary than are his colleagues and, in most cases, entitled also to more generous allowances. Such represents the accumulated wisdom of many generations and of many governments and parliaments. The Commission believes there is no requirement to depart from that wisdom.

PROVINCE OF ONTARIO
INDEMNITIES, ALLOWANCES & SALARIES PAYABLE TO MEMBERS AND MINISTERS (1972)

EXISTING	Indemnity per annum	Expense Allowance per annum	Additional Indemnity per annum	Represent. Allowance per annum	Salary per annum	TOTAL	Vouchered Accommodation Allowance
Premier	12,000	6,000	-	2,000	20,000	40,000	---
Minister with Portfolio	12,000	6,000	-	2,000	15,000	35,000	---
Minister without Portfolio	12,000	6,000	-	1,000	5,000	24,000	---
Parliamentary Assistant	12,000	6,000	-	-	5,000	23,000	---
Member	12,000	6,000	-	-	-	18,000	---
Speaker	12,000	6,000	5,000	-	-	23,000	---
Leader, Official Opposition	12,000	6,000	15,000	2,000	-	35,000	---
Leader, Minority Party (12 or more Members in Assembly)	12,000	6,000	4,000	-	-	22,000	---
Chairman, Committee of the Whole House and Deputy Speaker	12,000	6,000	per session 4,000	-	-	22,000	---
Deputy Chairman, Committee of the Whole House	12,000	6,000	per session 2,000	-	-	20,000	---
Chairman, each standing committee	12,000	6,000	per session 1,000	-	-	19,000	---
Chief Government Whip	12,000	6,000	2,000	-	-	20,000	---
Deputy Government Whip (2)	12,000	6,000	1,000	-	-	19,000	---
Official Opposition Whip	12,000	6,000	1,000	-	-	19,000	---
Party Whip, each party 12 or more Members, except Government & Official Opposition.	12,000	6,000	1,000	-	-	19,000	---

PROPOSED	Indemnity per annum	Expense Allowance per annum	Additional Indemnity per annum	Represent. Allowance per annum	Salary per annum	TOTAL	Vouchered Accommodation Allowance
Premier	15,000	7,500	-	4,500	25,000	52,000	6,000
Minister with Portfolio	15,000	7,500	-	-	18,000	40,500	6,000
Minister without Portfolio	15,000	7,500	-	-	7,500	30,000	3,000
Parliamentary Assistant	15,000	7,500	-	-	5,000	27,500	3,000
Member	15,000	7,500	-	-	-	22,500	3,000
Speaker	15,000	7,500	-	2,000	9,000	33,500	-
Leader of the Official Opposition	15,000	7,500	-	3,000	18,000	43,500	6,000
Leader, Minority Party (12 or more Members in Assembly)	15,000	7,500	-	1,500	5,000	29,000	6,000
Chairman, Committee of the Whole House and Deputy Speaker	15,000	7,500	-	-	per session 5,000	27,500	3,000
Deputy Chairman, Committee of the Whole House	15,000	7,500	-	-	per session 2,500	25,000	3,000
Chairman, each Standing Committee	15,000	7,500	-	-	per session 2,000	24,500	3,000
Chairman, each Select Committee	15,000	7,500	-	-	\$50/day up to \$2,000.	24,500	3,000
Chief Government Whip	15,000	7,500	-	-	per session 5,000	27,500	3,000
Deputy Government Whip	15,000	7,500	-	-	per session 3,000	25,500	3,000
Additional Government Whips (3)	15,000	7,500	-	-	per session 2,000	24,500	3,000
Official Opposition Chief Whip	15,000	7,500	-	-	per session 3,000	25,500	3,000
Additional Opposition Whips (2)	15,000	7,500	-	-	per session 2,000	24,500	3,000
Chief Party Whip, each party 12 or more Members, except Government and Official Opposition.	15,000	7,500	-	-	per session 2,500	25,000	3,000
Additional Whip, each party 12 or more Members, except Government and Official Opposition.	15,000	7,500	-	-	per session 2,000	24,500	3,000

CONTINUING REVIEW OF INDEMNITIES, SALARIES AND ALLOWANCES

In the course of its examination of Members' remuneration the Commission encountered a number of variations of the view that it would be desirable to have some mechanism for a more regular review of Members' remuneration. This would prevent the rather infrequent and consequently seemingly large salary increases which are common among elected officials. It would also help to ease the awkwardness of position of Members who must decide the level of increase of their own salaries. Accordingly, the Commission addressed itself to the question of attempting to tie future remuneration levels to some formula which would provide regular salary increases.

As we see it, there are four methods by which the above goal might be achieved:

(a) Increases in indemnity and expenses could be tied to changes in the cost-of-living index. The mechanism for this would be the Consumer Price Index as reported by Statistics Canada. Approximately one month after the end of each year a percentage figure for the increase from the previous year is available; this could be applied to the Member's remuneration to yield his new indemnity and expense levels.

(b) Increases could be tied to those achieved in collective bargaining agreements signed in Ontario, perhaps to a Provincial "break-out" from the Industrial Composite of Weekly Wages and Salaries. More specifically, they could correspond to the percentage increases of settlements as a whole for any year. Such statistics become available approximately three months after the year-end through the Ministry of Labour.

(c) Another alternative is to link increases to increases awarded by government to a certain class, or classes of civil servant, perhaps that of a branch director.

(d) Finally, this Commission, or some recurring form of it, could be given the task of making a finite recommendation in this area immediately after each general election. (New Zealand has a continuing Commission of a similar nature, as do a number of states in the U.S.)

After examining all these methods, the Commission does not feel in a position to make a recommendation in favour of any of them.

There is some question of the accuracy of the Consumer Price Index as a measure of changes in the cost-of-living. The Index tends to underestimate the effect of inflation on lower income groups, and overestimate its impact on higher income groups. In addition, to the extent that the Index does approximate the effects of inflation, tying Members' remuneration to it would give them a special status not enjoyed by any other group in society. They would not be hurt by inflation and, in a sense, would have a financial interest in increasing inflation.

The second and third alternatives could be construed as a situation in which Members would have a vested interest in the wage and salary negotiations of certain groups. This would be entirely inappropriate to their role as elected representatives. Furthermore, the run of the average increase established by collective bargaining has been well above the line of other indicators such as the cost-of-living index.

The fourth alternative presents certain difficulties in that it removes from the Government the initiative and, to a lesser extent, the decision-making ability in an area where it must still assume responsibility. Should our recommendations on the Offices of the Speaker and the Clerk be adopted, it is probable that the latter's role in the handling of Members' remuneration will enable it to provide the Government with advice in this area. However, the decisions as to when, and by how much, Members' indemnities and expenses are to be changed ultimately belongs to the Government. It must be answerable to the public for such decisions; consequently, it must be free to make them when

and how it sees fit. As unpleasant as it may be for the Government, and ultimately the Members of the Legislature, to set their own remuneration, it is still necessary under our system of responsible government.

Finally, we suggest that the practice of a fixed mechanism to review Members' remuneration might mask the need for further studies as the role of an M.P.P. changes. There is certainly evidence that, as the influence of government becomes more extensive and the population becomes more sophisticated, M.P.P.s will face a more demanding work-load.

PENSIONS

A SUMMARY OF PRESENT PROVISIONS

Pension benefits are provided for Members and Ministers under the terms of the Legislative Assembly Retirement Allowances Act. This Act was introduced in 1960 and an amendment was passed in 1968.

The following is a summary of the more important provisions of this Act as they now stand, showing the effect of the 1968 amendment.

Contributions

Each Member of the Assembly is required to contribute 6% of his indemnity. Each Minister is required to contribute 6% of both his indemnity and his ministerial salary.

When Pension is Payable

A Member or a Minister who has completed 5 or more years of service and has attained age 55 is entitled, on ceasing to be a Member, to a pension payable for life. If a Member is subsequently re-elected to the Assembly, or to the Federal Senate or House of Commons, or is subsequently employed by the Public Service of Ontario, or a Crown agency, this pension is interrupted during that period. A Member or Minister who has completed 5 years of service on ceasing to be a Member, but who has not attained age 55, may elect either a full pension commencing at age 55 or a reduced pension commencing immediately. The 5-year service requirement is a reduction from the original terms, which required 10 years of service before a Member or Minister could receive a pension.

Amount of Pension

The full pension payable to a Member is a percentage of the average annual indemnity which a Member has received over his period of service.

The percentage is $4\frac{1}{2}\%$ multiplied by the number of years of service which the Member has given. This means, for example, that a Member who retires after 10 years of service has a full pension of 45% of his average indemnity over those 10 years. The maximum pension, reached after approximately 22 years of service, is 100% of a Member's average indemnity. Alternatively, the pension may be expressed as 75% of Members' contributions.

For Ministers, the pension in respect of his ministerial salary is calculated in the same way, the only difference being that the maximum pension based on ministerial salary is one-half of that salary.

Benefits on Death

Pensions are payable for the lifetime of a Member and, if on his death after retirement on pension he leaves a widow, she will, under most circumstances, be paid during her remaining lifetime a pension equal to one-half of the Member's pension. The only provisos are that the widow must have been married to the Member before his 65th birthday and before he started to receive the pension. If the Member's widow remarries her pension ceases. The widow of a Member who dies in service, and who has contributed to the plan for at least five years, is entitled to a pension. If the Member was under age 55 when he died, then commencing when he would have attained age 55 his widow is paid one-half of the pension to which the Member would have been entitled. Alternatively, the widow may elect to receive a smaller pension commencing immediately.

If a Member dies before he has contributed to the plan for 5 years, or if there is no widow eligible to receive a pension, the Member's contributions are returned with interest to the beneficiary.

The provision of a widow's pension on the death of a Member while still in service, is a benefit which was added by the 1968 amendment to the Act.

BACKGROUND COMMENTARY

The Commission has felt justified in making a fundamental reappraisal of the Legislative Assembly Retirement Allowances Act which has been in effect since 1960, in order to determine whether it meets satisfactorily the needs of Members and their dependants. It should be noted that forty-six people now receive pensions under the Act, with total payments being in excess of \$18,000 a month.

Special Circumstances

It is recognized that the needs of an M.P.P. are somewhat different from those of most individuals in either industry or the professions. His political career may start at virtually any age and this career may be ended by political defeat at any time. The average length of service of the 117 M.P.P.s who now constitute the Assembly is approximately 9 years. We have established at the outset of this report that the duties of an M.P.P. are in most instances full-time, and that an M.P.P. should be paid on the assumption that his duties are full-time. The pension arrangements, therefore, should likewise be designed on the assumption that an M.P.P. has no means of accruing pension rights other than through this Act.

Re-Entering the Labour Market

Furthermore, an M.P.P. must be considered to have severed his connection with his previous occupation so that, on his return to private life, he is faced with the necessity of re-entering the labour force. The ease with which he is able to do this will naturally depend on the individual, but it is reasonable to expect that the age of the Member and the period for which he has been out of the labour market, will be significant factors.

NEW PROPOSALS

A Pension Formula

The need for a pension is clearly greatest where a Member's public service has left him unable to find suitable employment. Accepting that this is a function of both age and duration of service as an M.P.P.,

We propose that:

- 2.1 The conditions for payment of a full pension be a direct combination of both age and duration of service as an M.P.P., rather than the present conditions which basically provide for pensions to be payable on or before age 55. The formula would allow a Member to retire on full pension when his years of service, with a minimum of 5 years, together with his years of age, total 60 or more.

This would mean, for example, that an individual who became an M.P.P. at the age of 30 would, upon defeat after 15 years in the Assembly, be entitled to a full pension since his age at that time, 45, together with his 15 years of service, would add up to 60. If, on the other hand, he were defeated after 5 years in the Assembly, he would not be entitled to a full pension until age 55 which would be his situation under the present rules. By retaining the minimum service requirement of 5 years which presently exists, the maximum age at which a Member is first entitled to a pension under this proposal would be age 55, as at present. Table 1 shows the working of this formula in a number of situations:

TABLE 3

<u>Age when elected</u>	<u>Age when defeated or resigned</u>	<u>Years of service</u>	<u>Age at which full pension is payable</u>	
			<u>present arrangements</u>	<u>proposed arrangements</u>
25	30	5	55	55
25	35	10	55	50
25	40	15	55	45
25	45	20	55	45
35	40	5	55	55
35	45	10	55	50
35	50	15	55	50
35	55	20	55	55
45	50	5	55	55
45	55	10	55	55
45	60	15	60	60
45	65	20	65	65
55	60	5	60	60
55	65	10	65	65

To apply formula: The age of eligibility for full pension can be found by subtracting the Member's years of service from 60.

A Member intending to continue in the Legislature, who finds by this calculation that he is not yet eligible for full pension, can find out when he will be eligible by taking half the difference between the result of the calculation and his present age, and adding it to his present age.

One of the results of this proposal would be to recognize, within practical limits, that a young person who gives a substantial period of service to the Province is likely to have difficulty re-establishing himself and should be provided with a reasonable pension.

Electing An Immediate Pension in a Reduced Amount

We propose that:

- 2.2 The present provision be retained whereby a Member who is defeated, after 5 years' service but before he is entitled to a full pension, may elect an immediate pension in a reduced amount.

For those Members who elect a reduced immediate pension the effect of the new proposals in many instances would be to give a larger portion of full pension than under present rules. This is illustrated in Table 2. Figures below 100% are calculated from actuarial tables:

TABLE 4

<u>Age when elected</u>	<u>Age when defeated</u>	<u>Percentage of full pension payable immediately</u>	
		<u>present arrangements</u>	<u>proposed arrangements</u>
25	30	30%	30%
25	35	30	40
25	40	40	71
25	45	52	100
35	40	40	40
35	45	52	71
35	50	71	100
35	55	100	100
45	50	71	100
45	55	100	100
45	60	100	100
45	65	100	100
55	60	100	100
55	65	100	100

A second matter of fundamental importance is the amount of pension an M.P.P. receives, and the formula by which it is determined. The present formula has been criticized as producing inadequate pensions in many cases although, on the other hand, it is possible for it to produce excessive pensions in some cases. At present the calculation of a Member's pension is based on his average earnings throughout his career as an M.P.P. This means that an M.P.P. who has served over the past 20 years, when indemnities have risen drastically from \$2,000 to \$12,000, will receive a pension that is small in comparison to his current indemnity. On the other hand, a Member who has begun his service more recently and anticipates a long career in the House may, under present provision, retire on a somewhat generous pension. This latter situation would result because the Member can accrue a pension of up to 100% of his average indemnity; over a period of less drastic changes in indemnity, such a ceiling could result in a pension quite large when related to indemnity.

To meet both these criticisms, we recommend:

- 2.3 A pension formula based on the average indemnity received by a Member in his last 5 years of service, and that the maximum pension to any Member be 75% of such average indemnity. Specifically the formula would be 3½% of the final 5-year average indemnity for each of the M.P.P.'s first 10 years of service; 3% of such final average indemnity for each of the next 10 years' service; and 2% of such final average indemnity for each of the next 5 years' service to a maximum of 25 years' service.

Such a pension formula would automatically apply to new Members, and present Members would have the option of adopting the new formula or remaining on the present basis.

Benefits on the Death of a Member

A third area of concern is the amount of benefit provided on the death of a Member. Since the amount of income paid to a widow is geared to the pension accrued by the Member, it increases with service and only comes into effect after 5 years of service. The need for this benefit exists from the time a Member enters the Assembly, and does not increase with service. On the assumption that an M.P.P. has no other occupation while he is a Member, it follows that he should be able to look to the Legislature for adequate benefits of this type.

In practice, benefits to widows have not been substantial. Of 11 widows currently receiving benefits 6 have pensions of less than \$150 a month and, in 5 of those 6 cases, the Member had been in the Assembly for 10 years or more. The average benefit being paid to all widows is approximately \$180 a month. Table 3 shows how the pension to a widow depends at present upon the age of the Member at his death, and his length of service at that time:

TABLE 5

<u>Years of Service at Death</u>	<u>Annual Pension to Widow Commencing on Member's death at age</u>		
	<u>45</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>55 and over</u>
4 years	\$ nil	\$ nil	\$ nil
5	702	958	1,350
10	1,404	1,917	2,700
15	2,106	2,878	4,050
20	2,808	3,834	5,400
23 and over	3,120	4,260	6,000

Note: Amounts are based on the present \$12,000 p.a. indemnity, 6% contribution rate, and pension to Member of 75% of contributions.

It is noted that no provision is made for a widower's pension on the death of a female Member, which is contrary to the terms of the Human Rights Code.

The Commission recommends that:

- 2.4 On the death of a Member in service, his or her spouse be paid an income equal to 25% of the Member's indemnity or, if greater, one half of the pension which the Member had earned to date of death.

This spouse's pension would commence immediately on the death of the Member, regardless of Member's age at death, or length of service. Based on the present level of indemnity, this would ensure a minimum spouse's pension of \$3,000 a year on the death of a Member in service.

We propose that:

- 2.5 With regard to the death of a Member while in receipt of a pension, the pension be payable to the "spouse" rather than the "widow".

There has been criticism of the clause which renders ineligible for pension the wife who married a Member after his 65th birthday. We suggest that this could properly be changed to only exclude the spouse where the Member dies within one year of his/her marriage. We would retain the requirement that a spouse be married to the Member before he/she retires on pension.

Post-Retirement Adjustments

Adoption of the preceding proposals would protect the pension entitlements of both Members and their dependants from the effects of inflation until the Member or his/her spouse commences to receive pension. However, in the absence of any further provisions, the real value of

these pensions will be eroded by any inflation which occurs while pensions are in course of payment.

We propose that:

- 2.6 There be a regular review of pensions in course of payment every two or three years to determine whether an increase should be granted.

Ex-Members' Pensions

We have studied the amounts in course of payment to ex-Members at the present time, and we recommend that:

- 2.7 Effective immediately, pensions of former Members be increased by a percentage equal to 3% for each year between the year they became entitled to a pension and 1973; for widows a similar formula be based on the year in which the widow's pension commenced.

Contribution from Member

In view of the improved benefits which would accrue from the above proposals, we further recommend that:

- 2.8 The contribution required from an M.P.P. be increased from 6% of indemnity to 7%.

It will be seen from the following paragraphs that this higher rate of contribution would be in line with the provisions of other jurisdictions.

The above proposals represent major changes to the present arrangements. Therefore, at this point it may be helpful to consider the terms of pension plans in force for legislators in other jurisdictions. Such comparison will indicate the extent to which our proposals are innovative and the extent to which they follow current trends.

COMPARISON WITH PENSION PLANS OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS

Of prime interest to the Commission are the arrangements for Federal M.P.s and for Quebec M.N.A.s. We have also reviewed the plans of legislatures in some U.S. states, the United Kingdom, West Germany, New Zealand and the Australian states. In the following paragraphs we compare the features of these plans which correspond to the topics discussed above.

Federal Members of Parliament

Pensions are payable to a Member who is defeated after six years of service, regardless of his age at that time. In the great majority of cases this represents a more generous condition than either the present arrangement in Ontario or the one which we propose. The amount of pension is determined in accordance with the same formula as we propose for Ontario M.P.P.s.

On the death of a Member the Federal Plan provides an income to the spouse, regardless of the Member's age at death, equal to 60% of the pension earned to the date of death, plus a further 10% of his/her pension in respect of each child. This plan is more generous than the present Ontario plan, but is still subject to some of the criticisms we have made of that plan. No pension is provided on death in the first 6 years of service, and thereafter the benefit builds up year by year.

Members of the Federal Plan are required to contribute $7\frac{1}{2}\%$ of their indemnity and a further $\frac{1}{2}$ of 1% of indemnity to provide supplementary retirement benefits in recognition of cost-of-living increases. This rate of contribution is somewhat greater than the rate which we propose for Ontario but, as we have noted, the provisions of the Federal Plan are somewhat more generous.

It is interesting to note that the provisions described above came into effect on March 31st, 1970, and before then the plan was quite similar to the present Ontario Plan. Specifically, the M.P. contributed 6% of his indemnity and was entitled to an allowance of $4\frac{1}{2}\%$ of his average annual indemnity per year of service. The transition provisions allowed existing Members the option of staying with the old plan or taking the new plan, which applied to all Members elected subsequently.

Quebec M.N.A.s

A Member of the National Assembly is entitled to a pension after 5 years' service in at least two legislatures. There is no age requirement and in this respect the plan is similar to the Federal Plan. The amount of pension is related to the average indemnity which a Member receives over his whole service, and is equal to 6% of such indemnity for each year of service provided he serves at least eight years. However, if the Member retires after less than 8 years' service his annual rate of pension accrual is less, being 3-3/4% in the case of retirement after 5 years and rising to a rate of 6% on retirement after 8 years. It is an unusual feature for the rate of pension accrual for any one year to depend upon the length of service.

The Member is required to contribute 8% of his indemnity and he may elect to contribute a further 2% of his indemnity to provide a widow's pension payable on his death equal to 1/2 of his pension, plus a further 10% of his pension in respect of each child. This pension is payable regardless of the Member's age and is similar in form to the benefit to widows of Federal Members.

All pensions payable under the Act are indexed in accordance with the pension index under the Quebec Pension Plan.

OTHER COUNTRIES

Our review of arrangements in other countries was undertaken so we might be aware of any other practical approaches to the problem of providing adequate pensions in respect of comparatively short and unpredictable periods of service. While we have restricted ourselves to countries where the community and its way of life may be expected to be similar, we found a number of features which, while practical in their own country, would not be acceptable in Ontario.

State Legislatures in the U.S.A.

Several nation-wide studies are in existence. The overall situation is well summarized by the following extract from the Report of the 1971 Commission on Legislative Salary of Hawaii:

"Legislators in 35 States, including Hawaii, receive deferred additional compensation in the form of retirement benefits. The retirement plans are statutorily provided and usually operate by simply extending the benefits of the existing State employee retirement system to lawmakers. In 26 States, including Hawaii, legislators voluntarily participate in the retirement system; in 10 States participation is compulsory."

State legislators in the United States have quite different functions and benefits from those in Ontario. This is illustrated by the fact that the average biennial compensation for a State legislator was found by the Citizens Conference on State Legislatures in 1971 to be \$13,256. It is therefore not surprising that few special pension arrangements have been developed. An exception is New York State, where a Member may retire after 20 years of service at any age, with a pension of 1/2 of his pay.

United Kingdom

A special pension plan for M.P.s provides a pension based on a Member's salary in his last year of service. The amount is 1-2/3% of such

salary multiplied by the number of years of his/her service. The pension is payable from age 65 provided the Member has completed four years of service. Pension may be taken at a younger age in a reduced amount, but not below age 60.

Members are required to contribute 5% of salary. On death in service, and after completing four years of service, a pension of 1/2 the Member's accrued pension is payable to a widow or, if applicable, to a disabled and dependent widower. The pension is increased where there are dependent children. The widow's pension ceases if she "cohabits with another person".

Western Germany

For Members of the Federal Parliament there is a pension plan which provides a maximum pension of 75% of basic allowance on retirement on, or after, age 55, and after 16 years' service. The retirement age is related to service in a similar manner to our proposal for Ontario. For example, retirement is allowed at age 60 after 12 years' service, or at age 65 after 8 years' service. A widow's pension is payable based on the Member's accrued pension at his death. However, contributions are required from the Member at the surprisingly high level of 25% of basic allowance.

Australian State Parliaments

There is variation between the individual pension plans, but typically a Member is eligible for a pension on defeat or resignation after 8 years' service, the pension being payable regardless of age. The amount of pension is a percentage of salary, which increases with service from 30% or 40% after 8 years, to a maximum of approximately 70% after 20 years of service. Widows' pensions are payable, and in many states are related to the accrued pension rights of the Member. However, in Victoria and Queensland the pension is the greater of (a) 40% of Member's salary, and (b) 5/8 of the Member's accrued pension, which is the same

approach as we suggest for Ontario. Pensions are usually adjusted for cost-of-living increases from time to time, and only one state has adopted an automatic increase. Contributions are required from Members at rates varying from 9% to 11½% of salary.

New Zealand

Members of the House of Representatives are eligible for pension upon completion of 9 years of service and attainment of age 50. Pension is 3-1/8% of final basic salary per year of service, to a maximum of 66-2/3% of final basic salary. A widow's pension is payable equal to 1/2 the pension the Member would have accrued had he retired at age 60. Members are required to contribute at the rate of 11% of salary.

Summary

The preceding comparisons indicate the prevalence of the "final average earnings" concept in the determination of pensions. While there is wide variation in retirement ages, our proposal is seen to be less generous than the Federal and Quebec Plans; our concept has been adopted in Western Germany. Widows' pensions are almost universal, although they are usually related to the Member's accrued pension rather than to his salary. Contributions from Members are significantly higher than in Ontario, even if our proposal for increased contribution is adopted.

CANADA PENSION PLAN

Many Members have indicated that they would like the option to join the Canada Pension Plan.

The text of the Canada Pension Plan provides that "employment by Her Majesty in right of a province or by an agent of Her Majesty in right of a province" is excepted employment unless there is an agreement with the government of a province to include such employment as pensionable employment. Membership in the Canada Pension Plan would therefore

apply to all M.P.P.s if the decision were made to join.

The benefit to be gained by joining the Canada Pension Plan is very small in many circumstances. This is because of the so-called "drop-out" provisions whereby 15% of an individual's career earnings may be disregarded for pension purposes. As an example, consider the case of a Member due to reach age 65 in 1986 after 20 years in which he might have been a member of the C.P.P. If 9 of those years (the current average period of membership) are spent as an M.P.P., the reduction in C.P.P. benefit is approximately \$500 a year.

In comparison the present pension arrangements based on the current level of indemnity would provide over \$4,800 a year pension. Furthermore, the Members' pension plan is not "integrated", in recognition of the fact that Members do not belong to C.P.P. If Members were to be brought into C.P.P. there would be a strong argument for an integrated formula which would reduce pensions. In addition, the response to our questionnaire to M.P.P.s indicated that many have current business or professional commitments, and they presumably contribute to the C.P.P. through those commitments.

It is recognized that those Members who are now approaching age 65 may lose all C.P.P. benefits. However, if our proposals for a "final average earnings" formula are adopted these Members will benefit substantially.

We therefore recommend that:

- 2.9 M.P.P.s continue to be ineligible for the Canada Pension Plan.

INTERRUPTION OF PENSION

The Act provides that a Member's pension will be suspended if he is subsequently re-elected to the Assembly, or elected to the House of Commons, or accepts employment with the Ontario Civil Service. Members feel pension should only be interrupted in the event of re-election to the Assembly.

It can be argued that the generous rate of pension is given on the assumption that a Member will be unable to find other employment. However, it is not practical to interrupt this pension when a Member does find other employment in the private sector, and it is therefore unreasonable to do so for public service other than as an M.P.P.

We therefore propose that:

2.10 An M.P.P.'s pension only be interrupted by further service as an M.P.P.

It is noted that the Pension Plan for Quebec M.N.A.s makes a similar provision.

PORTABILITY OF PENSION

Concern has been expressed for the pension rights both of the individual who, on ceasing to be an M.P.P., becomes a Federal Member, and of the Federal Member who becomes an M.P.P. It has been said that in such situations accrued pension rights cannot be transferred. It is helpful to set out the extent to which pension rights are lost under the present arrangements.

An M.P.P. who becomes an M.P. after 5 years of service retains his right to the pension he has accrued, but payment of his pension is interrupted while he serves as an M.P. On the other hand, an M.P. who

becomes an M.P.P. after 6 years of service retains his right to the pension he has accrued and such pension is not interrupted. An individual who moves between legislatures prior to completing the above-mentioned eligibility periods, receives only a refund of his contributions with interest.

One instance of pension loss is interruption of payments while an ex-M.P.P. sits as an M.P. We have already proposed that this interruption should no longer apply.

With regard to the loss of pension rights on ceasing to be a Member after short periods of service, we have considered the possibility of a reciprocal agreement between the jurisdictions concerned. However, from discussions with an official of the Federal Treasury Board, we find there is reluctance on the part of Ottawa to enter into such an agreement, and a similar request from British Columbia has already been rejected. The reason for this reluctance is the generous nature of the retirement provisions of the Federal Pension Plan for M.P.s (pension commencing at any age on ceasing to be a Member after 6 years of service), which would confer a substantial benefit on an ex-M.P.P. who went to Ottawa after, say four years of service. In view of the generosity of the Federal Plan, we do not recommend that any formal approach be made to Ottawa on behalf of M.P.P.s who become M.P.s before qualifying for a pension.

However, the same reasoning does not apply to M.P.s who become M.P.P.s since the provincial plan includes an age requirement for receipt of pension, and will continue to do so if our proposals are accepted.

We therefore propose that:

- 2.11 An M.P. who becomes an M.P.P. before he has become entitled to a pension from the Federal Plan, be allowed to contribute to the Provincial Plan the amount which he received as a refund of his contributions to the Federal Plan, with interest.

In return, he would be credited with either:

- i. under present arrangements, a pension of 75% of his contribution exclusive of interest, or
- ii. under our proposed arrangements, the period of service for which he contributed as an M.P.

We note that the Province of Quebec recently proposed a similar agreement with respect to an M.P. who becomes an M.N.A.

INSURANCE

There is presently no plan of insurance specifically designed for Members of the Assembly, although a Member may participate in some of the insurance plans available to employees of the Government of Ontario.

A Member now has the option to insure his life for \$2,000 and he pays the full cost of such insurance. This amount was, until recently, the amount of mandatory basic life insurance for Ontario civil servants. When coverage was increased to 75% of salary for civil servants, Members of the Assembly were not offered the increased coverage.

A Member may also elect supplementary life insurance on the same basis as a civil servant. This means that, in addition to the basic \$2,000 insurance, he may elect coverage equal to either one times or two times his annual indemnity. Since this insurance is also optional the Member is required to pay the full cost.

However, it should be remembered that a death benefit of considerable value is provided by the widow's benefits contained in the recommended pension plan for Members.

Our review of the insurance provisions for Members has been conducted from the same viewpoint as our review of the pension provisions, namely on the assumption that an M.P.P. must be considered as having full-time duties and that he has severed his connections with his previous occupation. The insurance benefits available to him should, therefore, be sufficient to meet his reasonable needs.

With regard to life insurance, the need will largely be met if our proposals to improve the spouse's benefit under the pension plan are adopted. However, some lump sum death benefit is necessary, not only for funeral and re-adjustment expenses, but to defray estate taxes that

may be payable in respect of the capitalized value of the spouse's pension.

GROUP LIFE INSURANCE

The Commission proposes that:

- 3.1 The basic group life insurance of 75% of annual salary, which is mandatory for civil servants, be introduced for M.P.P.s

Since strong support was evidenced among M.P.P.s for a shared-cost life insurance program, we recommend that:

- 3.2 A shared-cost life insurance program be compulsory.

On this basis we believe it would be practical to provide this insurance as an extension of the Civil Service Plan, and we recommend that:

- 3.3 M.P.P.s pay the same rate as civil servants, namely 13 cents a month per \$1,000 of basic group life insurance.

An M.P.P. would retain the option to purchase supplementary life insurance as at present, entirely at his own expense.

LONG-TERM DISABILITY INSURANCE

With regard to long-term disability insurance, no benefits are currently available to M.P.P.s. This benefit is provided for Ontario civil servants and is common in the private sector. It is noted that Federal M.P.s are eligible to participate in both the life insurance and long-term disability benefits provided for Federal civil servants.

The long-term disability plan for Ontario civil servants provides

on total disability an income which commences after 6 months and which continues during disability to age 65, in the amount of 50% of salary. Membership is compulsory and employees pay a premium of 1/6 of 1% of salary on a shared-cost basis.

The Commission proposes that:

- 3.4 The long-term disability plan for civil servants be extended to M.P.P.s on a compulsory, shared-cost basis.

APPENDIX

ONTARIO COMMISSION ON THE LEGISLATURE

FIRST REPORT

COMPARATIVE STUDY OF M.P.P.s
FOR THE YEARS 1952, 1962, AND 1972

<u>AVERAGE AGE</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1972</u>
	53.8 years	55.0 years	48.6 years
<u>HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION</u>			
(1) Public School	14	14	6
(2) Secondary School	17	24	32
(3) Post Secondary School:			
i. Community College Equivalent	6	5	6
ii. University	41	44	66
(4) Unknown	12	11	6
<u>OCCUPATION</u>			
(1) Merchant, dealer, distributor	18	22	19
(2) Business management, Executive, owner	9	9	17
(3) Teacher	0	5	14
(4) Farmer	19	19	10
(5) Lawyer	13	18	20
(6) Municipal politician (apparently sole occupation)	6	3	0
(7) Miscellaneous	14	16	32
(8) Unknown	11	6	4
<u>NUMBERS OF VOTERS PER CONSTITUENCY</u>			
Average number of voters	19,738	19,224	28,066
Number of Constituencies with:			
less than 10,000 voters	3	4	0
10,000 - 15,000 "	24	26	8
15,000 - 20,000 "	29	32	20
20,000 - 25,000 "	18	15	19
25,000 - 30,000 "	7	8	26
30,000 - 35,000 "	5	2	16
35,000 - 40,000 "	2	2	12
40,000 - 45,000 "	0	2	10
45,000 - 50,000 "	0	1	2
50,000 - 55,000 "	1	1	2
55,000 - 60,000 "	0	0	0
60,000 - 65,000 "	1	0	0
65,000 - 70,000 "	0	0	0
70,000 - 75,000 "	0	0	1

NOTE: There were:

90 M.P.P.s in 1952

98 M.P.P.s in 1962

116 M.P.P.s in 1972 (1 seat vacant when study taken)

A COMPARISON OF M.P.P.s' REMUNERATION
with the
GROSS PROVINCIAL PRODUCT AND PROVINCIAL NET GENERAL REVENUE

The Commission has compared the progress of Ontario M.P.P.s' remuneration with the Gross Provincial Product and the Provincial Net General Revenue. For this purpose indemnity and expense allowance have been combined into total remuneration.

In Graph 1 a trend line for M.P.P. remuneration is shown. It is remarkable how closely the progress of M.P.P.s' remuneration has paralleled the increase in Gross Provincial Product. The Graph also shows how much more steeply Net General Revenue has increased than either Gross Provincial Product or M.P.P.s' remuneration. We believe it is important to determine to what extent the public expectation of services from government in Ontario has increased in the last twenty years. This steepness in the Net General Revenue curve demonstrates how expectations have increased.


By projecting the Gross Provincial Product and M.P.P. income curves a range can be arrived at within which M.P.P. remuneration could be expected to rise in 1973. This range appears to be \$23,000 to \$25,000 a year.

In addition to a comparison with Net General Revenue in Ontario, M.P.P. incomes have been compared with Net General Revenues in other provinces. This is shown in Graph 2. This Graph shows on the one hand the great difference in revenues between Ontario and Quebec, and all other provinces on the other. It also shows a distinct correlation between the Net General Revenue and the total spent by each province on M.P.P.s' indemnities and expense allowances in a year.

GRAPH 1

MPP REMUNERATION IN ONTARIO


Historical Comparison with Gross Provincial Product and
Net General Revenue



GRAPH 2

MPP REMUNERATION IN CANADIAN PROVINCES

Comparison of Total Amounts with Net General Revenues



REMUNERATION OF PRIVATE MEMBERS (1972)

	B.C.	ALTA.	SASK.	MAN.	ONT.	QUE.	N.B.	N.S.	P.E.I.	NFLD.
Total Lump Sum Remuneration	7,500	7,200	12,500	9,600	18,000	22,740	10,500	7,500	6,000	10,000
Sessional Indemnity	5,000	4,800	(1) 6,000	(2) 7,200	12,000	15,600	8,000	5,000	4,000	6,666
Expense Allowance	2,500	2,400	6,500	2,400	6,000	7,140	2,500	2,500	2,000	3,333

ADDITIONAL VARIABLE AMOUNTS

Per Diems , Accommodation Allowance, etc.	\$50. day during the session maximum \$2,000.	\$30. day during the session if residing other than normal residence	\$20. day during the session	\$15. day for out-of-town Members during the session	---	accountable accommodation allowance up to a maximum \$200. per month for out-of-town Members	accountable allowance to maximum of \$25. per day for out-of-town Members; \$8. per day subsistence allowance for in-town Members - both allowances during session only	\$20. day for Members living 25 miles or more from capital.	---	---
Out-of-Session Committee Meetings	Per diems as fixed by order-in-council plus expenses	\$40. day plus expenses	---	\$40. day plus expenses	\$50. day plus expenses	---	\$30. day plus expenses for Chairman	---	---	---

- Members from the Alberta constituencies of Meadow Lake, Athabasca, and Prince Albert East receive additional \$750. indemnity.
- Members from outside Winnipeg receive an additional \$600. per session. Four northern Manitoba Members receive an additional \$1,500 per year.

REMUNERATION OF SPEAKERS (1972)

	B.C.	ALTA.	SASK.	MAN.	ONT.	QUE.	N.B.	N.S.	P.E.I.	NFLD.
Total Remuneration	16,500	12,000	17,500	14,600	23,000	40,360	16,500	12,000	7,500	17,000
Salary	9,000	--	5,000	5,000*	5,000	14,560	5,000	4,500	1,000	5,500
Sessional Indemnity	5,000	8,000	6,000	7,200	12,000	15,600	8,000	5,000	4,000	6,666
Expense Allowance	2,500	4,000	6,500	2,400	6,000	10,200	3,500+ actual expenses	2,500	2,500	4,833

In addition, the Speaker also receives any accommodation allowances, sessional per diems, etc. given to private Members of his Legislature.

* The Speaker in Manitoba also receives an allowance of \$40. per day plus expenses when performing duties related to his office on days when the House is not sitting.

REMUNERATION OF CABINET MINISTERS (1972)

	B.C.	ALTA.	SASK.	MAN.	ONT.	QUE.	N.B.	N.S.	P.E.I.	NFLD.
Total Remuneration	27,500	22,200	27,500	25,200	35,000	41,400	26,500	24,000	16,000	21,000
Salary	20,000	15,000	15,000	15,600	15,000	15,600	16,000	16,500	10,000	11,000
Sessional Indemnity	5,000	4,800	6,000	7,200	12,000	15,600	8,000	5,000	4,000	6,666
Expense Allowance	2,500	2,400	6,500	2,400	8,000	10,200	2,500	2,500	2,000	3,333
Accommodation Allowance	\$50. day during session maximum \$2,000.	\$30. day if residing other than normal residence	---	---	---	accountable accommodation allowance to a maximum of \$200 month if from out-of-town	---	\$20. day if living 25 miles or more from capital	Minister of Finance receives an additional \$1,000 salary	---

REMUNERATION OF PREMIERS (1972)

	B.C.	ALTA.	SASK.	MAN.	ONT.	QUE.	N.B.	N.S.	P.E.I.	NFLD.
Total Remuneration	30,500	25,200	32,500	26,200	40,000	47,620	38,000	26,000	21,000	22,000
Salary	23,000	18,000	20,000	16,600	20,000	20,800	25,000	18,500	15,000	12,000
Sessional Indemnity	5,000	4,800	6,000	7,200	12,000	15,600	8,000	5,000	4,000	6,666
Expense Allowance	2,500	2,400	6,500	2,400	8,000	11,220	5,000	2,500	2,000	3,333
Accommodation Allowance	\$50. day during session maximum \$2,000.	\$30. day if residing other than normal residence	---	---	---	accountable accommodation allowance to maximum of \$200. month if from out of town.	---	\$20. day if living 25 miles or more from capital	---	---

Institute of Environmental Research Inc.

THE PUBLIC'S PERCEPTION OF THE M.P.P.

REPORT ON REMUNERATION

MAY 1973

DAVID HOFFMAN
RESEARCH ASSOCIATE

FRED SCHINDELER
PRESIDENT

INTRODUCTION

The tabulations presented in this report were based on a weighted sample of 1500 respondents. There were actually 1540 interviews conducted between January 6 and February 6, 1973, but the result of weighting to compensate for the effect of certain groups - particularly young males - not being at home at the time the interviewer called reduced the N in tables to 1500. This was a large sample, capable of yielding reliable conclusions about the attitudes of Ontario respondents. (In no case was the difference between weighted and unweighted tables larger than 2%.)

This report focuses on the public's assessment of the M.P.P.'s remuneration. The socio-economic characteristics of respondents were related to this assessment in order to try to discover the extent to which opinion varied significantly from one part of the community to another.

As context for the detailed discussion of remuneration we observed the following general perceptions of M.P.P.s and their work.

- A. M.P.P.s ranked third - ahead of five other occupations - listed in importance of their service to society. (Twenty-seven percent of the sample placed M.P.P.s either first or second, whereas only 13% placed M.P.P.s in the bottom two ranks.)
- B. Knowledge of one's M.P.P. was very much greater in smaller communities than in the largest cities, especially in Metro Toronto.
- C. The majority of Ontario respondents claimed that their M.P.P. was known and respected and accessible to them. They also believed that the influence of the M.P.P. on the government had increased in the last decade. On the other hand a majority of the sample also stated that they believe the attention of M.P.P.s wanes after election.
- D. Honesty, integrity and sincerity were perceived as the qualities of the ideal M.P.P., and the ideal role they saw him playing was that of the conventional constituency-oriented lawmaker, of democratic mythology.

- E. The M.P.P.s were not very well known by their constituents; 46% of the sample knew neither the name nor the party of their M.P.P.
- F. Most people did not report much contact of any kind with their M.P.P. although contact with the government through the M.P.P. was regarded as preferable to other methods suggested.
- G. The vast majority of respondents saw the job of M.P.P.s as properly a full-time job and in fact most felt that M.P.P.s were actually doing a full-time job; although a significant minority (21% of the sample) thought that M.P.P.s were doing as part-time what the respondents considered to be a full-time job.)

Taking all of the perceptions together we have concluded that, although M.P.P.s were generally not well known and were not contacted very frequently by their constituents, they seemed to be well thought of by the people of Ontario. They enjoyed "diffuse support." In this report we have examined attitudes towards a rather more specific kind of support namely, remuneration for their efforts.

SUMMARY

- (a) The vast majority of Ontario respondents did not know how much M.P.P.s were paid at the time of the survey.
- (b) A very large percentage of the sample (37%) expressed no opinion on the question of whether M.P.P.s were paid more or less than they should be; and the majority thought their present pay was "about right".
- (c) The majority of respondents clearly did not think M.P.P.s should be paid as much as medical doctors or Supreme Court judges and they were divided on the idea of paying M.P.P.s as much as M.P.s. A plurality of those with an opinion favoured paying M.P.P.s as much as Quebec deputies, but the largest part of the sample did not have a view on the subject.
- (d) Opposition to an improvement in remuneration was strongest among those who saw the job of M.P.P. as full-time but believed that M.P.P.s were doing a part-time job.
- (e) Generally speaking, degree of education emerged as most strongly related to attitudes about M.P.P.s, their work and their appropriate remuneration: The better educated were more favourably disposed generally than the less well educated and this tended to be the case with family income and occupation which correlated less strongly in the same direction, i.e. those with higher incomes.

THE PUBLIC'S ASSESSMENT OF M.P.P.s REMUNERATION

How much do people think M.P.P.s are paid?

The Study attempted to evaluate perceptions of the M.P.P.'s remuneration from several angles.

One method was to ask: "From what you know, what do you think an M.P.P. is paid for being a Member of the Provincial Legislature?" Significantly, 48% said they did not know, or gave no answer to the question; only 13% placed it in the range from \$11,000 to \$18,000 and a further 15% said \$18,000 specifically. Five percent thought that M.P.P.s are paid at least \$26,000. Table I sets out the full range of responses (grouped into 8 categories from the original responses). In subsequent analysis of opinion on the M.P.P.'s pay, we have collapsed the codes still further.

TABLE I

OPINION ON M.P.P.'s PAY AT THE PRESENT TIME (percentages)

DK/NA	48
0 - \$10,999	5
\$11 - 15,999	11
\$16 - 17,999	2
\$18,000	15
\$19 - 20,999	8
\$21 - 25,999	6
\$26 and more	<u>5</u>
Total	100
n = (1500)	

Differences in opinion on this question were not strongly related to many attitudes or socio-economic characteristics. The higher the education of the respondent, the more likely he was to have an opinion on the amount M.P.P.s are paid: 72% of respondents with less than 5 years of schooling said they didn't know as compared to only 25% of those who had completed university. However, the difference in the proportions answering correctly is not significant. There are few other variations among groups.

Are M.P.P.s Paid Enough?

Respondents were also asked whether they thought that M.P.P.s "who are not Cabinet Ministers are paid less than they should be; about what they should be; or more than they should be?" The majority of those who had an opinion said "about right"; but 35% did not have an opinion and a further 2% did not answer the question.

TABLE II

EVALUATION OF PAY FOR M.P.P.s

(percentages)

M.P.P.s paid too little	9
M.P.P.s paid about right	41
M.P.P.s paid too much	13
DK	35
NA	<u>2</u>
Total	100
(n = 1500)	

One might expect that evaluations of this subject would be associated with one's evaluation of the contribution of M.P.P.s to society, but cross-tabulation showed that it was not: respondents who ranked M.P.P.s very high in their contribution to society were no more likely than those who ranked them low to say that they thought M.P.P.s should be paid more. Nor did those who thought M.P.P.s are more influential

today than they were 10 years ago think they should be paid more.

However, opinion was related to level of education: whereas only 8% of the most poorly educated thought M.P.P.s should get more pay, 21% of the university educated thought so. Conversely, belief that M.P.P.s are paid too much is negatively related in a linear way to level of education. Also noteworthy is the fact that those who keep themselves informed about politics were more inclined to be positive in their opinions about the level of remuneration.

Some people believed that, although being an M.P.P. ought to be a full-time job, M.P.P.s were working only part-time. Table III shows that those who perceived M.P.P.s as part-timers when they should be full-time were most inclined to say that M.P.P.s are paid too much.

TABLE III

PERCEPTIONS OF M.P.P.s AS FULL-TIMERS BY ATTITUDES TOWARDS
REMUNERATION

(percentages)

<u>OPINION OF M.P.P.s PAY</u>	<u>PERCEPTION OF FULL-TIMERS</u>			
	1*	2*	3*	4*
Too little	12	7	9	7
About right	50	43	37	26
Too much	7	12	24	13
DK	31	37	25	55
NA	1	1	5	0
Totals	101	100	100	101
n =	350	550	309	130

*These categories are:

1. M.P.P. is a full-time job and M.P.P.s are spending more time than normal on the job.
2. M.P.P. is a full-time job and M.P.P.s are spending full-time at it.
3. M.P.P. is a full-time job but M.P.P.s are part-time on the job.
4. M.P.P. is a full-time job but R does not know how much time M.P.P.s are spending.

Table IV explores the relationship between perceptions of M.P.P.s as full-timers and assessments of how much M.P.P.s are paid. There is no strong association, the only noteworthy fact being that those who thought that being an M.P.P. is more than a full-time job were most inclined to have an opinion on the subject. In addition, it might be noted that there was some tendency to over-estimate the M.P.P.'s pay on the part of those who felt that it is a full-time job but that M.P.P.s are only devoting part-time to it.

TABLE IV

PERCEPTION OF M.P.P.s AS FULL-TIMERS BY ESTIMATES OF PRESENT
REMUNERATION

(percentages)

<u>THINK M.P.P.s PAID:</u>	<u>PERCEPTION OF FULL-TIMERS</u>			
	1*	2*	3*	4*
Up to \$18,000	20	19	17	10
18,000 - 19,000	20	14	14	10
19,000 - 24,999	15	13	18	12
More than \$26,999	6	4	10	4
Don't know	39	50	42	64
	<hr/>			
	n= 350	550	309	130

* These codes are given in Table III.

Although respondents differed somewhat in the extent to which they said they knew how much M.P.P.s actually earn, there was no significant difference between those respondents who thought the job was full-time and believed the M.P.P. was doing a full-time job and those respondents who perceived M.P.P.s as part-timers at a full-time job. The latter, in other words, did not differ significantly from others in the amounts they thought M.P.P.s earn; the difference between them was whether it was too much.

In Table V we see that those respondents who thought the job was full-time but did not know how M.P.P.s were actually performing the job (code 4), were usually more inclined also to say that they did not know whether or not the present pay was enough. Otherwise it shows that at every estimate of M.P.P.'s earnings, those who thought M.P.P.s were doing a part-time job were most inclined to say they were paid too much.

TABLE V

PAY EVALUATION BY JOB PERCEPTION, CONTROLLED FOR ATTRIBUTED EARNINGS

Think M.P.P.s are paid:	Don't know how much M.P.P. is paid				Think M.P.P. paid less than \$18,000				Think M.P.P. is paid \$18,000				Think M.P.P. is paid \$19-27,000				Think M.P.P. is paid more than \$27,000			
	JOB EVALUATION				JOB EVALUATION				JOB EVALUATION				JOB EVALUATION				JOB EVALUATION			
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	
too little	6	4	6	4	25	15	11	11	10	7	2	11	7	11	19	6	33	0	10	*
about right	32	35	27	15	55	48	43	38	71	59	47	38	61	48	43	52	57	58	45	*
too much	9	9	22	14	4	8	<u>21</u>	8	4	16	<u>43</u>	8	11	20	<u>29</u>	14	4	18	<u>23</u>	*
DK	52	51	38	67	16	28	19	43	15	16	5	43	23	21	24	29	5	25	14	*
NA	1	2	7	0	0	1	5	0	0	0	3	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	20	*
N=	138	275	128	83	69	105	52	13	69	78	43	13	54	69	55	16	22	23	29	

*n too small to percentage

The percentage climbs to 43% among those respondents who thought M.P.P.s were paid \$18,000.

Obviously, we want to know something about the social characteristics of this critical group of respondents. Examination of many cross-tabulations indicates that, once again, level of education was most closely associated with the assessment. Table VI shows clearly that a favourable assessment of the M.P.P.'s job was directly associated with degree of schooling. But, level of education did not significantly differentiate the group of respondents (code 3) that has been noticed as important for its critical opinion.

TABLE VI
ASSOCIATION BETWEEN EDUCATION AND PERCEPTION OF M.P.P.s AS
FULL-TIMERS

(percentages)

		<u>LEVEL OF EDUCATION</u>		
		up to grade 10	grades 11 - 13	some/complete university
Job Evaluation Codes:	1	21	27	37
	2	40	45	36
	3	25	22	20
	4	<u>14</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>6</u>
	TOTAL	100	101	99

More sharply differentiating was the language mainly spoken in the home. The vast majority of the sample (88%) stated that English was their main spoken language; the proportion of respondents coded 3 among English speakers was therefore very close to the proportion for the sample as a whole. But, for what it is worth, it may be noted that whereas only 21% of English speakers and 18% of French speakers said that they thought being an M.P.P. was a full-time job but M.P.P.s were doing it part-time, 25% of Italian speakers, 48% of German speakers, and 24%

of 'Other' speakers gave this response. The number of German speakers is too small to attribute statistical significance to the percentages reported, but the differences might prove to be important. However, obviously, so few German speakers in the sample ($n = 13$) could not account for the variations in perceptions of the job that we have noted.

Although neither sex nor income level further differentiated the categories, the most politically efficacious respondents were significantly more prominent in code 1 and significantly less prominent in code 3: conversely the less efficacious appeared slightly more frequently than expected in code 3. Knowledge of the M.P.P., on the other hand, was not related to code 3, although, as might be expected, those who know the M.P.P. best were more prominent in code 1.

Attitudes Towards an Increase in M.P.P.s Remuneration

We noted that 13% of the total sample thought M.P.P.s were paid too much. These broke down into the finer divisions set out in Table VII.

TABLE VII

BREAKDOWN OF RESPONDENTS THINKING M.P.P.s EARN TOO MUCH BY ESTIMATES OF PRESENT REMUNERATION

(percentage)	<u>of subsample</u>	<u>of total sample</u>	<u>N</u>
Think paid too much but don't know how much he is paid	43	6	83
Think paid less than \$18,000 and it is too much	13	2	25
Think M.P.P. is paid \$18,000 and it is too much	19	2	36
Think M.P.P. is paid \$19,000 - \$27,000 and it is too much	19	2	35
Think M.P.P. is paid more than \$27,000 and it is too much	6	1	13
TOTALS	99	13	192

It is significant, perhaps, that only 4% of the total sample hold the joint opinion that the M.P.P. is earning \$18,000 or less and that this is too much.

Half the respondents in the sample, in answer to the question of whether M.P.P.s are paid more or less than they should be, said either that their pay was about right or too little. This group may at least be considered in the first instance as favouring no reduction in salary, and therefore can be considered together. The group breaks down as follows:

TABLE VIII			
BREAKDOWN OF RESPONDENTS THINKING M.P.P.s ARE PAID TOO LITTLE OR ABOUT RIGHT			
(percentage)	of subsample	of total subsample	N
DK how much M.P.P.s are paid	33	17	247
Think M.P.P.s are paid less than \$18,000	22	11	168
Think M.P.P.s are paid \$18,000- \$19,000	20	10	150
Think M.P.P.s are paid more than \$19,000	25	12	185
TOTALS	100	50	750

Two facts - - that so many respondents who think that the M.P.P.'s pay is about right (or too little) do not actually know how much they are getting and that some of those who think that they get too much inflate the present remuneration - suggest the utility of attempting to divide the subsample of those who have an opinion on whether M.P.P.s should be paid more into two groups: those who appear to favour an improvement in the existing pay and those who do not. Certain assumptions must be made, the first being that \$18,000 is a good approximation of the present remuneration.

The following criteria were the basis of division for analytical purposes: A respondent was considered to favour salary improvement if:

- (a) he did not know how much M.P.P.s were paid but thought they were not paid enough (n = 36)
- (b) he thought M.P.P.s earn less than \$18,000 and are not paid enough (n = 45)
- (c) he thought M.P.P.s are paid \$18,000 and thought it was too little (n = 14)
- (d) he thought M.P.P.s are paid more than \$19,000 and that this was about right (n = 148)
- (e) he thought M.P.P.s are paid more than \$19,000 and that this was too little (n = 37)

A respondent was considered opposed to change if:

- (a) he did not know how much M.P.P.s are paid but thought it was about right (n = 212)
- (b) he did not know how much M.P.P.s are paid but thought they are paid too much (n = 83)
- (c) he thought M.P.P.s earn less than \$18,000 and that that is about right (n = 124)
- (d) he thought M.P.P.s earn less than \$18,000 and that that is too much (n = 25)

Totalling the respondents in each of these categories yields two groups, the one representing the 19% of the total number of respondents who favoured improvement of the present pay and another group of 30% of the sample who did not want to see an improvement in the present remuneration. The rest of the sample (51%) did not have a clearly enough formed opinion on the matter to permit classification. In the discussion which follows we treat the subsample as a whole without regard to the large number of respondents for whom no information is available:

Thus, repercentaging, omitting the latter, shows 39% of the subsample in favour of improving remuneration and 61% opposed. Our interest centres on significant variations from these subsample averages.

Interestingly, many simple bivariate tables showed significant associations between several social characteristics. For example, whereas among the highest educated respondents there was an even split between favouring and opposing an upward adjustment in remuneration, among less well educated respondents only one-third were in favour. As might be expected, these differences were found with respect to both occupation and family income; the majority of respondents in every income group below the level of \$15,000 were opposed to improvement, but among the two groups classified as \$15,000 to \$17,000 and \$18,000 and over a majority (about 55%) actually favoured an increase in remuneration. Most opposed (72%) were those in the skilled labour occupations, followed closely by those who were unskilled (66%).

In addition, assessments of the remuneration question were associated with the sex of the respondent - women being more opposed than men; age - the young and the old being more opposed than the middle age groups; and perceptions of the job of an M.P.P. - those whom we have described as perceiving the job as full-time and believing that M.P.P.s are doing at least a full-time job favouring an increase, all others being opposed. The most efficacious, as determined by our index, showed a majority in favour of improvement, whereas only 31% of the least efficacious favoured an increase.

Clearly there is a strong likelihood that some of the variables are closely related to one another in such a way that some of the simple relationships might prove spurious; but there is also the possibility of more complex interaction between variables. Table IX shows the extent to which sex and level of education interact with different effects on assessment of whether or not M.P.P.s should receive an increase in remuneration.

If we look at the response of males only, we see that the association between level of education and assessment of remuneration breaks down: the least educated and the highest educated were identical; among women, on the other hand support for an improvement in remuneration does increase with level of education (although it was not quite as extensive among the highest educated as it was among men). The very strongest opposition to an increase was centred among women with education up to only grade ten (81%): indeed it is their opposition which strongly affected the overall position of the lowest education level group when men and women were left together in a simple bivariate table. Opposition was also intense in the middle education level group of women, the one with 11 to 13 years of schooling.*

The logic of this type of analysis suggests that by combining a few more variables and reducing the size of the subsample accordingly we could discover groups - say the most poorly educated, young wives of skilled labourers - amongst whom opposition to an increase in remuneration would be total. Generally we see that social class, income, and sense of political efficacy run together and that the better off in Ontario are better disposed towards M.P.P.s generally and are better able to contemplate an improvement in the level of remuneration that would bring the M.P.P. closer in income to the respondent's own level. To the struggling working class housewife, however, even \$12,000 seems like a lot! It must be remembered, however, that the discussion has centred only on a subsample who have a clear opinion on the subject of remuneration: the largest proportion of the sample as a whole had none.

* A further multivariate analysis controlling for nationality showed no differences in the education-sex patterns of Table IX, except that the opposition among middle education level foreign-born men reached a level comparable to the most opposed women.

TABLE IX

ASSESSMENT OF CHANGE IN REMUNERATION BY EDUCATION AND SEX

	Male Education			Female Education		
	Up to Grade 10	Grades 11-13	Some/ completed University	Up to Grade 10	Grades 11-13	Some/ completed University
Favour increase	53	37	53	26	30	45
Oppose increase	48	63	47	81	70	55
N=	157	112	104	139	144	66

Comparative Evaluations of M.P.P.s' Remuneration Level

Respondents were asked to say whether M.P.P.s should be paid as much as people in some other occupations. Table X shows clearly that most Ontarians do not think they should be paid as well as medical doctors (no = 61%) or Supreme Court Judges (No = 47%). A slight plurality of our respondents (45/42) favoured paying M.P.P.s as much as M.P.s, but the comparison with Quebec deputies was less clear: over twice as many people said "yes" as "no", but the largest single group had no opinion (41%).

TABLE X
PAY COMPARISONS WITH OTHER GROUPS

(percentages)				
Should M.P.P.s be paid as much as a....	Medical Doctor (GP)	M.P. (Ottawa)	Ontario Supreme Court Judge	Member of National Assembly of Quebec
Yes	25	45	27	38
No	61	42	47	16
DK	11	12	23	41
NA	3	2	3	5
(n = 1500 throughout)				

Support or opposition for the idea of paying M.P.P.s as much as Supreme Court Judges appeared to be random: it was not associated significantly with any attitude or social characteristic that we could discover. On the question of paying the equivalent of a Quebec Deputy's stipend the only differences to emerge in any significant way were in respect to the proportion of respondents with an opinion on the subject: the effect was to show the better educated and people in higher occupations more favourable to an increase in salary.

Knowledge of one's M.P.P.'s name was not associated with evaluations of whether M.P.P.s should get as much as Quebec deputies. It might prove interesting to speculate on the fact that those who knew their M.P.P.s were actually slightly less inclined to think they should get as much as a doctor. However they were slightly more inclined to say that they should be paid as well as M.P.s.

There was no clear and consistent pattern with respect to the four comparisons, but in general we may conclude that willingness to see an improvement in the M.P.P.'s salary - since a 'yes' answer to all of the choices offered may be taken to represent an increase - was more typical of the better educated. Not surprisingly, those who were less attentive to politics were less inclined to have an opinion on the questions we asked about comparative levels of remuneration.

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Canadian Federation of University Women
Ontario Secondary School Teacher's Federation
Prof. C.E.S. Franks, Kingston
C. H. Billings, Niagara Falls
Ontario Progressive Conservative Party Caucus Committee
on the Legislature
Tony Pasinski, Toronto.

*The Commission has received a number of briefs. Those listed above deal, at least in part, with the subject of this report.

